# Feminism K

### Notes

The 1nc in the file functions on two planes; the first part critiques the representations presented by the affirmative team, while the second part is a critique of the debate community itself for perpetuating a culture of sexism and prioritizing discussion of fake impact scenarios over gendered violence. The alternative is a feminist pedagogy which is serves to change our orientation towards education and the traditional cannon introduced in debates by embracing uncomfortability and critical analysis of the affirmative. At the same time, feminist pedagogy is meant to break down the notion of civility that helps prop up sexism in debate. Personal narratives and performance can be used to actualize the k alternative. The k can be split to focus more on one aspect or the other, which would also decrease the amount of time spent in the 1nc— you do you!

Some disclaimers: Feminism is a broad term and is accompanied by a broad field of literature. This file only delves into small subsections of it, and some of the authors may be more politically correct and up to date with their understanding of what feminism should mean. Be aware of representations, the way you choose to define “women”, and whose authorship you endorse.

If you have any questions about running the k or cards with the signature PZ, please feel free to email me at [petra.zuniga99@gmail.com](mailto:petra.zuniga99@gmail.com)!

Thank you to all my amazing lab leaders for an amazing experience at Wake Forest—yay debate!!

--Petra

# \*Neg\*

## 1NC

#### ( this is a generic education reform link, replace/add aff specific links)

#### The affirmative’s attempt at education reform is just moving furniture in the same chauvinistic living room—they miss the underlying cause of sexism and racism and lead to further victimization of women, particularly women of color

Perry ’16, Ph.D. in education policy and leadership from the University of Maryland-College Park and current contributing writer at The Hechinger Report, (Andre, “How education reform exacerbates sexism: Firing thousands of female teachers and expelling black girls props up patriarchy,” *The Hechinger Report*, <http://hechingerreport.org/how-education-reform-exacerbates-sexism//> PZ

Tucked away from the hoopla and ruckus of the Democratic National Convention at a quaint restaurant a few miles away, approximately 200 people gathered at “Rights4Girls at the DNC” to rally around issues ostensibly washed out in the convention hall. Instead of red, white and blue streamers, the room was festooned with art and info-graphics, which described the state of girls and women in the United States. A picture inspired by a 12-year-old girl who was trafficked for sex in California was put up for auction. A poster read, “Girls are the fastest growing segment of the juvenile justice system.” “One of the priorities that we would add to a platform for marginalized young women and girls is to dismantle the sexual abuse to prison pipeline that’s criminalizing our girls, in particular our girls of color, for being victims of sexual abuse,” said Yasmin Vava, executive director of Rights4Girls. The event did more than simply highlight injustices suffered by school-aged girls, it launched a new campaign that illustrates how school reform often ends up making those injustices worse. Our society is so weighted by the gravity of sexism that our laws, “solutions” and “reforms” contribute to the victimization of those we are supposed to protect. During the event, Vava and honored guests spoke to the criminalization of victims of child sex trafficking in the United States. Speakers made clear there should be no difference between abusing a child and paying to abuse a child through prostitution. In many states trafficked children aren’t always protected by statutory rape laws. There is no such thing as a child prostitute; it’s rape. “When we fail to recognize there is no difference between these two acts, we’re actually protecting abusers. We are shielding the men who abuse these children and who essentially pay to rape these children,” Vava added. The topic of child sex trafficking, and sexism in general is not one that education reformers pay much attention to, but they must start if we’re really going to uplift communities of color. Are governance changes through charter schools protecting girls and women? Are curricula teaching boys not to shame women? Are discipline practices further victimizing marginalized students, including young women who have suffered abuse? Rigidly focusing on “gap closing” misses underlying causes and immediate threats of sexism, sexual abuse and poverty that that many young girls of color face, and how that those factors impact their education and future prospects. Rights4Girls awarded three champions working to end sex trafficking and gender-based violence. U.S. Rep. Bonnie Watson Coleman, CEO of the 2016 DNC Committee Leah Daughtry and Wake Forest University professor Melissa Harris-Perry received crystal plaques of appreciation, but their collective work on youth sex trafficking provides example of a local, national and educational strategy to end state-sanctioned sexism, which injures and kills girls and women in multiple ways. Judge Lori Dumas, activist Michael Skolnik and Philadelphia mayor Jim Kenney also spoke about their commitments to end sex trafficking. Research shows that black and Latina girls who are suspended are more likely to drop out of school and face the juvenile justice system. The Rights4Girls website reports 66 percent of incarcerated girls are girls of color despite them making up only 22 percent of the general youth population. Seventy-three percent of girls in the juvenile justice system report past histories of physical and sexual abuse and 40 percent are LBGTQ youth. “So let’s put ourselves in the shoes of young black and Latino men and women who face the effects of systemic racism, and are made to feel like their lives are disposable.” Changing laws and policies around prostitution and expulsion is only one step toward changing the systems of oppression that really generated the disparities, just as helping students of color score higher on standardized tests isn’t sufficient to overturn the systems of oppression that keep them from reaching their potential. In an era in which “disruption” and deconstruction of school districts are seen as victories, we seldom see replacements to the former arrangements that take on patriarchy and white supremacy. The speakers at Rights4Girls reinforced the notion that dismantling systems of patriarchy requires changing laws like those around prostitution, but it also demands the promotion of healthy forms of masculinity. Likewise, ending harsh disciplinary school practices, inequitable funding structures, and racist curricula demand we replace them with positive models. Protecting girls also requires unlearning how we insidiously shame and abuse girls and women, including in schools, and it requires an education reform strategy that is fundamentally different from what is offered currently. If education reform isn’t specifically trying to replace systems of patriarchy and white supremacy, what exactly are we doing? At the culminating speech of the DNC, the Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton said, “So let’s put ourselves in the shoes of young black and Latino men and women who face the effects of systemic racism, and are made to feel like their lives are disposable.” Rights4Girls’ explicit efforts to replace patriarchy should be copied in education. It’s become clear that “gap closing” isn’t a substantive goal. From New Orleans to Newark, we’ve learned there are too many nefarious ways to close an achievement gap. We’ve removed worker protections and fired majority women teachers, in the name of closing gaps. We expel girls and boys of color, writing them off as unavoidable casualties in the battle to close the gap. And we’ve funded and empowered white, paternalistic organizations to implement these approaches. Addressing the root causes of racism, and, just as important, sexism requires upending something far more fundamental than school autonomy and test-based accountability. It’s time we stopped thinking that moving furniture in the same chauvinistic living room is the same as extracting its sexist foundation. Rights4Girls’ example teaches me that education reform can be more a tool of patriarchy and racism than a solution. We have to do more than put ourselves in the shoes of young black and Latino men and women. We must hold ourselves accountable to ending patriarchy and systemic racism.

#### (insert impact card)

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of adopting a feminist pedagogy—we must embrace discomfort in order to critique the curriculum and educational spaces we engage. Feminist pedagogy is key to thinking critically about the traditional canon of patriarchal education.

**Robinson ’11**, MA in Applied Women’s Studies and Communication Director at Mission Access Fund, (Tara, “Teaching Activist Intelligence: Feminism, the Educational Experience and the Applied Women's Studies Department at CGU,” *CGU Theses & Dissertations*, 7. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu\_etd/7. doi: 10.5642/cguetd/7 // PZ

Professor of Education Kathleen Weiler states: “I would like to suggest that feminist pedagogy, like feminism itself, is ultimately a political project” (67). Most feminist professors writing about feminist pedagogy have a similar appreciation for the intrinsically political nature of feminist pedagogy. Weiler describes the role feminist pedagogy plays in the field of education: In terms of education, feminists have been influential in challenging the structure of the traditional canon and in suggesting alternative classroom practices; both of these interventions have been included in the broad term feminist pedagogy. . . . What distinguishes feminist pedagogy from these other approaches, of course, is its analysis of patriarchy and attempts to develop an education appropriate for women. (68) As this description shows, feminist pedagogy is not only teaching about feminism; it simultaneously mandates a feminist critique of the educational process, as well as implementation of anti-hierarchal techniques in the classroom. This practice helps to reeducate students holistically, enabling them to become empowered, active learners and assisting them with using their educational experience as a means of social justice. This empowerment however, must overcome a “hidden curriculum” lurking within the university system (Boyer and Larson, 168-169). According to psychologists Boyer and Larson, this “hidden curriculum” is composed of rules for advancement and success, messages regarding who belongs in the university and who is outside it and, “institutionalized monocultural androcentrism” which demands cultural transformation of anyone from “outside” the university—all forcing minorities (including women) to abandon their cultural uniqueness in exchange for academic success (168-169). In order to overcome these problems, feminist pedagogy strives to create a space and a method for its students to unlearn these rules and arm themselves with theory that supports their self-rediscovery, so that they can better cope in more traditional university courses. Professor of English Magda Gere Lewis explains: Women often come away from the experience of the feminist classroom not only with new understandings both of history and of possible futures—the wish for a feminist utopia embedded in practice rather than the death wish for a perfect world—but, as well, prepared to articulate practical strategies for critique which challenge the androcentric biases of their other courses. This does not always gain them favor. Their experiences reflect how difficult this is to do in the face of resistance and the determined power of the status quo to hold firm its privilege to articulate our collective meaning. (67) According to professor of women’s studies Jean Fox O’Barr, preparation for a lifestyle of resistance to the mainstream is needed by women’s studies graduate students, in particular, given that their academic department is not only their “social” but their “professional” world as well (117). Women’s studies graduate students often choose to merge their extracurricular social justice work with their professional work, making their professions a site of cultural resistance. As a result, this double identification with their department ensures that women’s studies graduate students “experience the issue of isolation more intensely” (O’Barr, 117). For many, the women’s studies method is something to be feared: 38 Graduate students often find explorations into the history of feminist scholarship both critical and frightening. They know that without this material they cannot get the full benefit of their disciplinary journeys. Yet gaining a feminist perspective makes them angry, frustrated, and sometimes discouraged with how much remains to be done. . . . Graduate students face another reality: that learning this new material requires them to unlearn some of their collegiate knowledge they have mastered and to which they cling when so many previous foundations are being shaken. (O’Barr, 117-118) Conversely, if students are willing to enter into an uncomfortable critique, unlearn cherished knowledge and be filled with anger and frustration, the payoffs can be as intense as the difficult process of feminist exploration. In Teaching to Transgress The feminist classroom was the one space where students could raise critical questions about the pedagogical process. These critiques were not always encouraged or well received, but they were allowed. That small acceptance of critical interrogation was a crucial challenge inviting us as students to think seriously about pedagogy in relation to the practice of freedom. (6) , English and women’s studies professor bell hooks describes this transformation: For bell hooks, being free begins with learning how to think critically: “In our society, which is so fundamentally anti-intellectual, critical thinking is not encouraged. . . . Conditions of radical openness exist in any learning situation where students and teachers celebrate their abilities to think critically, to engage in pedagogical praxis” (Teaching to Transgress, 202). Many feminist scholars insist that teaching students to think critically must serve as the foundation to feminist pedagogy. Professors of English Amy Spanger Gerald, Kathleen McEvoy and Pamela Whitfield write: “Critical thinking, as manifested in the ability to resist accepted truths about literature, traditional modes of writing, and stereotypical ideas about speaking, is a feminist approach because it fights limiting and inherently patriarchal educational practices” (48). Feminist teachers want students to learn how to be comfortable being uncomfortable and want to provide them with experience and skills (partially through the use of alternative classroom techniques) to deal with this lifestyle of constant confrontation.

#### Policy debate is imbued in patriarchal biases. Women are held to a double edged sword—they are either too passive to live up to the masculine ideals in debate or when they do try to be more assertive they are labeled as aggressive and bitchy

Kaufman 16 (Ava Kaufman, “Fairness in High School Forensics Under Debate”, 10/3/16, <http://womensenews.org/2016/10/930950/m>, mjb)

NEW YORK CITY (WOMENSENEWS)—As a novice, Anna Maria Mangafas expected a steep learning curve on a nationally renowned debate team she joined as a freshman, but she did not expect discrimination to be one of her experiences. Halfway through her first season last year, her and her female partner found themselves debating two boys on the benefits of an American carbon tax. While the questioning periods between opposing speakers, known as crossfires, are often lively, this one was pretty “heated,” Mangafas said from her home in New York City. “As soon as the crossfire ended, he was like, ‘This girl’s a bitch.’ to his partner, loud enough for the judge to hear,” she said. Although the insult was audible, the young man was not reproached. Mangafas didn’t report the incident to the tournament staff. “I felt like I shouldn’t report it is because of the whole over dramatic crazy woman stereotype, like girls flipping out over nothing,” she said. It was an eye-opening moment for Mangafas. “It made me see that when I’m able to beat a guy and like take charge of a round it’s my fault? Like, am I to blame for being successful? It also really highlighted the double standard of like how girls who are assertive are catty but guys are commended for it.” For the four teens interviewed for this article over Facebook messenger, dealing with sexism was as much as part of the extra curricular activity as was public speaking and presentation skills. These girls look back on the experience and realize they were treated differently than the boys. They were given less attention, support and simply not taken as seriously as their male counterparts. “I earned the names ‘dragon lady’ and ‘PMS dragon’ on the circuit as a novice because I was very assertive (and the opposite is usually associated with Asian women),” said one Iowan teen, a competitor on local and in national elite tournaments. “It made me feel as though my arguments were sub-par because I was ‘too aggressive’ and scared judges into voting for me.” She, like others interviewed for this article, asked to remain anonymous in order to avoid backlash from the debate community. These young debaters are hesitant to formally go on the record about the gender bias they experience because they fear repercussions and negative comments from the judges, who are in regular rotation on the debate circuit. Poor relationships with judges can lead to lost rounds, and lost rounds can impact chances at college scholarships targeted at successful young female debaters, as well as chances at becoming elected officials within their own debate teams. To let off steam and seek peer support in a safer, more anonymous environment, young women of this generation have taken to social media. Here, they can discuss the gender discrimination and air complaints about coaches, teammates, competitors without fear of retribution. Sites, including breaktheceiling.org and badballotblog.wordpress.com allow young women an open discourse on issues including what they perceive as judges’ sexism. A recent post from an anonymous debater includes a ballot from a Public Forum round between a pair of girls and a pair of boys. From the ballot, it seems to have been a hotly contested round. The judge notes that the young men were strong, forceful, and clear, and that these qualities are “very good.” However, the young female debaters were cautioned to”monitor [their] emotions.” Another debater, a member of a nationally competitive team who asked to remain anonymous because, “I just don’t want to end up personally implicated or outed, there’s a crazy social stigma on the team and the circuit on talking about people’s fucked up nature and things,” told Teen Voices over private message that her coaches were part of the problem as well. “They would also blatantly prefer coaching the guys on the team, never offering the girls coaching at tournaments,” she said. She also recalled incidents where female teenage competitors were rated by their looks instead of their skills. High school forensics, better known as “speech and debate,” has been a gender-stratified activity from its conception in 1925. The elimination of separate “Boys’ Extemporaneous Speaking” and “Girls’ Extemporaneous Speaking” in 1984 is evidence many coaches and students use to argue that separatism and sexism is still very much alive in the community. In 1985, policy debaters at the National Debate Tournament, sponsored by the American Forensic Association with the Ford Motor Company Fund, were 75 percent male and 25 percent female and the numbers had made little progress towards equality as late as 2001. Debate’s gender breakdown is difficult to ascertain now, because a representative for the National Speech and Debate Association told Teen Voices that the gender of competitors is not collected at tournament registration, which is the case for the majority of the national circuit. Any observation on gender distribution would be a guesstimate. “Female competitors are on either end of a double-edged sword” Savon Ayodeji, director of debate at Capitol Debate, a for-profit organization that administers academic camps and provides debate support to metropolitan areas globally, said. “We, as a society, have created certain norms such as what types of voices, styles, and mannerisms, that we think embody persuasiveness. Unfortunately, this ‘ideal debater’ image tends to be the opposite of a large amount of perceived female qualities like higher voices and potentially less aggression. [Female participants] debate the way they are comfortable and are told you aren’t ‘aggressive’ enough or they try to identify with those norms and are told they are ‘too aggressive.’” To account for the struggles of young women in the activity, Ayodeji notes actions the organization takes to maintain a gender balance in the activity. “Capitol Debate makes a point of hiring strong female lead staff so that female students who attend our camps have a female role model to look up and talk to about the debate community and being a participant in it.” It seems these actions have a positive outcome, as he says Capitol has hosted camps where female students outnumber their male counterparts. Gender discrimination also manifests in sexuality and gender identity becoming fodder for judges’ criticism. One young individual, a junior varsity debater in college who grew up in Kansas and prefers they/them pronouns, shared the discrimination they faced because of their queer identity and beliefs. “I have been called a dyke, voted down because I was ‘too passionate about feminism,’ and told that my narrative about my past was ‘made up and whiny.’” They said. “We must integrate womxn and minorities into the judging pool, and change our attitude towards others. It is not fair that judges resent judging me from the start.” However, one girl at least was able to own her nickname as “Dragon Lady.” “I started to embrace my nickname. I would walk into a room, and these boys who would typically look at an Asian woman and be like ‘easy win’ were now looking at an Asian woman and saying ‘it’s her, goddammit.’ It turned the tables on the oppressive power structures in place in debate.”

#### The alternative is a prior question-- before we can engage in political and civil discourse about the impacts of the affirmative we must use feminist pedagogy to break down the notions of civility that plague the debate community

Lozano-Reich & Cloud ‘9, Assistant Professor at Loyola Marymount University and Associate Professor at The University of Texas respectively, (Nina Lozano-Reich & Dana Cloud, “The Uncivil Tongue: Invitational Rhetoric and the Problem of Inequality,” *Western Journal of Communication*, pp. 220-226 // PZ

Bone et al. acknowledge that historically, societal standards of decorum have often been used to silence groups and keep them in their place. Nowhere is this truer than in the case of women, told to play nice with their oppressors (Ehrenreich & English, 2005). But the authors contradict this position when they argue, ‘‘When we adopt an invitational approach and are civil [emphasis added], the potential for grief and violence is minimized’’ (p. 457). Likewise, they write, ‘‘Civility ... can be understood as an ... integral component of democracy’’ (p. 457). Based upon historical and contemporary examples, we reject these claims; when theorizing as to how individuals should deal with ‘‘difficult situations,’’ our authors’ call for adopting an invitational paradigm grounded in civility is not only antithetical to the goals of invitational rhetoric, but also in combating systems of oppression. Historically, dominant groups have repeatedly enacted civilizing strategies to effectively silence and punish marginalized groups (e.g., labor; women and people of color; the poor; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender [LGBT] people). Indeed, 19th-century notions of propriety and civility were used as cultural ideals to place legal, political, and physical restrictions on women—whereby relegating women to the private sphere (Oravec, 2003). Antifeminists frequently appealed to masculine norms of ‘‘civilization’’ to ‘‘depict women as less civilized than men, less able to contribute to the advancement of the race’’ (Bederman, 1995, p. 121). Extending this history, women of color have been silenced through civilizing strategies that deem legitimately angry speech to be ‘‘uppity’’ ‘‘or ‘‘illiterate’’ (Anzaldu´ a, 1999; hooks, 1989). It has taken decades of critical feminist scholarship to resist politics of civility and overcome oppressive stereotypes so that women of color can be viewed as speaking subjects, and not as uncivilized subjects needing a firm hand. Similarly, LGBTQ sexual practices have also been vulnerable to oppressive charges of indecorum. Culturally, dominant sexual ethics and decorous community standards function to shame queer individuals, and stigmatize nonnormative acts of sexuality (Morris & Sloop, 2006; Warner, 1999). One need only look to hate crimes enacted upon gays or immigrants, or acts of femicide inflicted upon women who dare to speak out. Clearly, a move towards civility in relation to oppressed groups may potentially increase grief and violence. Bone et al. claim that civility fosters democracy. While voting is indeed civil, radical social change has not occurred in voting booths, but results, instead, from democratic grassroots tactics. Protestors inherently do not operate within the realm of decorum. Indeed, political confrontations up to and including violence have been perennial resources in struggles for justice (Kirkpatrick, 2008). The civility standard is detrimental to this project. When measured by standards of civility, protesters are framed as wild and riotous by dominant media, rendering their struggles illegitimate (Gitlin, 2003). In a post-9=11 climate, moreover, ‘‘uncivil’’ protestors are equated with terrorists (and terrorists cannot be ascribed any rationality whatsoever). Bederman (1995) asks whether conforming to mainstream standards of civility replaces one kind of exclusion with another. This paradox holds except in cases of discourses among equals. Discourses of civilization ‘‘have proven [to be] a slippery slope for those who dream of a more just society’’ (Bederman, 1995, p. 239). Likewise, Mayo (2002) argues that ‘‘civility is a form of social discrimination, for it is predicated on making distinctions that support accepted practices and values, and entails enacting those distinctions to the detriment of the purportedly uncivil’’ (p. 82). In other words, we view Bone et al.’s argument for invitational civility in situations of conflict as potentially perpetuating discrimination in the name of peace. Theorizing resistance to oppression requires attention to both invitation and confrontation, along with criteria enabling critics to evaluate both modes. Consequently, we believe it is irresponsible to displace more confrontational models for social change in favor of a politics of civility that has been proven to leave those already disempowered in a continued state of conformity, punishment, and/or silence. Civility, in short, should not be advocated as a stance for feminists or others struggling for change. Although beyond the scope of this brief response to present a complete theorization of when and under what conditions invitational, civil discourse provides an ethically desirable stance, we have attempted here to posit equality as the necessary prerequisite (not outcome) for a productive invitational, civil discourse. Bone et al.’s defense of invitational rhetoric begs the question of when invitation and civility are functional for the oppressed and when they are not. We contend that defending invitational rhetoric in conditions of antagonism is fraught 224 N. M. Lozano-Reich and D. L. Cloud with contradictions exposed in exploration of the historical uses of ‘‘civility’’ to discipline women and Others. Unfortunately, invitation and civility are as likely to be bludgeons of the oppressor as resources for the oppressed. Further conversation about the merits of invitational rhetoric must grapple with this contradiction. The cause of justice may not need a theory of invitation but rather a theory of the uncivil tongue.

## Policy Links

### Academic Achievement

#### Using achievement standards to gauge diversity is a neoliberal tool that obscures the true opportunity gap

Ringrose ‘7, Professor of the Sociology of Gender and Education at the Institute of Education at University College London, (Jessica, “Successful girls? Complicating post‐feminist, neoliberal discourses of educational achievement and gender equality,” *Gender and Education*, Vol. 19, No. 4, July 2007, pp. 471–489)

The shift in the onus in debate from the object of the failing boy to the successful girl, also, however, marks a shift away from a problem oriented discourse, that there is a problem with the effects of globalizing economic changes for masculinity onto a success based discourse of femininity. In a context of neoliberalism and ‘choice biographies’ the qualities ascribed to femininity have a central place in a discourse of success (Aapolo et al., 2005; Walkerdine & Ringrose, 2006). The desegregation of gender in schooling, higher education and many jobs, places the distinction between ‘men’s and women’s ‘roles’ and ‘domains’ into question, radically disrupting the social construction of gender. The qualities of reinvention, adaptation, flexibility, malleability to outside market forces that are in demand are ones that are traditionally feminine. The gender shifts we are witnessing require that both men and women increasingly perform what Lisa Adkin’s (1995) calls an ‘aesthetics of femininity’ and adaptation. Femininity is marshalled in new ways to sustain an educational arena obsessed with academic achievement that is itself merely part of a broader neoliberal ethos of individualization, competition and marketization (Walkerdine & Ringrose, 2006). Dianne Reay suggests, however, in contrast to this argument and the reactive ‘feminization of education’ thesis, that in education with its ‘growing emphasis on measured outputs, competition and entrepreneurship, it is primarily the assertiveness and authority of masculinity rather than the aesthetics of femininity that is required and rewarded’ (2001, p. 165). The task, then, is to somehow juggle both feminine and masculine attributes, for girls to inhabit and take up sights of masculine and feminine desire (Walkerdine, 2005). This is the new highly complex and contradictory work of ‘doing’ girl, and of performing complex dimensions of specifically ‘bourgeois’ success in increasingly neoliberalized sites of schooling and work (Walkerdine & Ringrose, 2006).

The feminine, therefore, takes on new meaning as site of crisis, anxiety and desire in contemporary educational discourses and in wider socio-economic and political contexts (Harris, 2004; Aapola et al., 2005). We find a story that implies it is possible to win and be successful in the shifting global economy, and girls and feminine subjects, because of their flexibility, adaptability and hard work in spheres of education and work are the prototypes for this success. This radically decontextualized, success based discourse represents a solidification of neoliberal preoccupation with individualizing logics that inculcate youth to continually re-adapt and reinvent themselves to the shifting conditions of globalization. This is the ‘free market feminism’ described by McRobbie (2004), where girls have become the new poster boy for neoliberal dreams of winning, and ‘just doing it’ against the odds.

### Employment

#### **Adequate employment plays on traditional conceptions of masculinity and the respective roles of men and women within the nuclear family – that feeds into Trump’s narrative about the plight of the working class white man**

Chira ‘17, assistant managing editor for news of The New York Times (Susan, 6/24, “Men Don’t Want to Be Nurses. Their Wives Agree.” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/24/opinion/sunday/men-dont-want-to-be-nurses-their-wives-agree.html?mabReward=CTS2&recp=1&moduleDetail=recommendations-1&action=click&contentCollection=Briefing&region=Footer&module=WhatsNext&version=WhatsNext&contentID=WhatsNext&src=recg&pgtype=article)

It seems like an easy fix. Traditionally male factory work is drying up. The fastest-growing jobs in the American economy are those that are often held by women. Why not get men to do them?

The problem is that notions of masculinity die hard, in women as well as men. It’s not just that men consider some of the jobs that will be most in demand — in health care, education and administration — to be unmanly or demeaning, or worry that they require emotional skills they don’t have. So do some of their wives, prospective employers and women in these same professions.

The jobs report for May contained discouraging news: continuing low labor-force participation, now below 63 percent overall. About 20 million men between the prime working ages of 20 and 65 had no paid work in 2015, and seven million men have stopped looking altogether.

The rage and despair of some of them helped propel Donald Trump to the White House. They may be waiting for him to deliver on his promise to bring back well-paid manufacturing jobs. Economists fear a long, fruitless wait.

In the meantime, the jobs most in demand — like nursing and nurse assistants, home health care aides, occupational therapists or physical therapists — sit open. The health care sector had the largest gap between vacancies and hires of any sector in April, for example.

And it is not only blue-collar men who recoil at taking traditionally female jobs.

Ofer Sharone, an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, has studied middle-aged white-collar professionals who have lost their jobs. He found that some men who might have been willing to consider lower-paid jobs in typically feminine fields encountered resistance from their wives, who urged them to keep looking.

“Marriages have more problems when the man is unemployed than the woman,” Professor Sharone said. “What does it mean for a man to take a low-paying job that’s typically associated with women? What kind of price will they pay with their friends, their lives, their wives, compared to unemployment?”

That may be, he said, because other sociologists have found that while work is important to both men’s and women’s identities, there remains a difference. “Work is at the core of what it means to be a man, in a way that work is not at the core of femininity,” he said.

### Gender Policy Affs

#### The “successful girls” narrative feeds into neoliberal individuation and calcifies the post-feminist narrative that treats gender inequality as a thing of the past – outcome focused pushes for equality inevitably flatten race and class differences by failing to conceive of gender as a relational category

Ringrose ‘7, Professor of the Sociology of Gender and Education at the Institute of Education at University College London, (Jessica, “Successful girls? Complicating post‐feminist, neoliberal discourses of educational achievement and gender equality,” *Gender and Education*, Vol. 19, No. 4, July 2007, pp. 471–489)

This paper has suggested we are witnessing a discursive proliferation around the motif of the successful girl—a figure that signals massive public ‘gender anxieties’ and ‘gender desires’ in rapidly transforming institutional and economic contexts (Segal, 1999). Girls success at school signifies the surest inculcation of a brave new ‘postfeminist’ world, where issues of gender inequality are positioned as no longer posing a problem, and where success is held up as there for the taking for ‘a kind of young woman celebrated for her “desire, determination and confidence” to take charge of her life, seize chances, and achieve her goals’ (Harris, 2004, p. 1). Girls’ new found ‘equality’ and power becomes a meritocratic formula, a signifier, a ‘metaphor’ for the hard work needed to attain educational and career success.

We need to continue working out the complex effects of the post-feminist, neoliberal discourse of successful girls. There are massive contradictions now facing girls and boys within an educational terrain where feminine qualities of adaptation and flexibility, and masculine levels of assertiveness and performance are rewarded, but it is girls who are viewed primarily to be adapting and succeeding (Walkerdine & Ringrose, 2006). While this paper has traced some of the discursive sites of contradiction, we are seeing new empirical research exploring girls experiences in such schooling climates, and the difficulty of navigating spaces of contradiction and ‘impossibility’ in these new subject positions where girls are to be both ‘bright and beautiful’, ‘heterofeminine/desirable and successful learner’, ‘aggressor and nurturer’, among other highly contradictory subject locations enlivened through the discourses of successful girls (Archer, 2005; Niemi, 2005; Renold & Allen, 2005; Youdell, 2004; Walkerdine, 2005). This research challenges, for example, the notion that femininity is ever valorized, illustrating how girls’ performance of hard work, cooperation, and flexibility is still pathologized as feminine, in the minefield of gendered regulations and expectations that inform schooling (Walkerdine et al., 2001; Francis, 2005, Renold & Allen, 2005). The reactive ‘feminization of education’ thesis mobilized in the educational debate is also exposed as ludicrously simplistic, in the wake of the painful costs of living contradictory gender identities in today’s schools.

This new research reminds us again that measures of so called gender equity in academic achievement do not necessarily translate into ideals of wider social equality inside or outside of schools (Murphy & Elwood, 1998; Niemi, 2005). Rather there are devastating effects when girls are positioned as ‘not a problem’ and resources siphoned away from addressing girls’ learning and emotional needs at school (Osler et al., 2002; Crudas & Haddock, 2005). We need a great deal further research to continue mapping the effects and implications of the post-feminist, girl power, ‘gender order’ in education and beyond (Connell, 1987).

In this difficult representational context key issues remain over how feminists can continue to complicate and disrupt these claims to gender equality: How are we to reinvoke feminisms’ legitimacy in what I’ve been calling a post-feminist discursive gender terrain that continuously ‘undoes feminism, on the basis that it is “always already known”’? (McRobbie, 2004, p. 13). How can feminism influence debates over education, without evoking a ‘gender seesaw’ once again (Collins et al., 2000)? Which feminism(s) do we ‘do’?

Addressing such questions involves returning to the core tenets of feminist epistemologies to reconsider difficult philosophical questions about equality vs. difference, to continue asking questions about whom the multiple subjects and objects of feminist theory and political change are to be (Young, 1990). The gender shifts we are witnessing are in part the ‘reactionary recuperation of feminist insights and concerns’, but they also involve a more complex relationship between feminism, discourses of equality and the new neoliberal formulas for success, which are dramatically reshaping the realms of education, work and family, I have been tracing (Epstein et al., 1998, p. 14). Liberal feminisms’ gender-only analysis has culminated in measures of equity through gendered test results, which violently obscures socio-economic difference. This brand of feminism is also therefore culpable in and productive of a post-feminist, neoliberal politics that holds up the ‘girl’ as proof that an individualizing ethos of hierarchical competition, performance and standards in education is working. It is only by staking out the type and scope of our feminist analysis very carefully that our feminism will not be complicit with simplistic gender analyses, and will not as easily be co-opted into the seductive discourse of successful girls.

#### Economic equality doesn’t solve structural equality

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Why is there not a straightforward relationship between gender equality and victimization of women? One possibility is that these mixed results are due to different measurements of gender equality. But if we assume that these studies have somewhat comparable measures, it is possible that these diffuse findings result from the absence of ideological controls. Varieties of patriarchal ideology may exist apart from structural conditions. Patriarchal ideology may endure despite structural gains in gender equality. Theorizing varieties of patriarchy must contend with potentially divergent ideological and structural conditions. For example, a common line of theorizing is that women can increase their status through their access to resource-generating work and, by extension, increase their well-being and safety (Blumburg, 1984; Chavetz, 1990). However, if the prevailing patriarchal ideology locates women’s worth primarily in reproduction and mothering, then increases in resource-generating opportunities (structural status) might reduce the perceived value of women. Or there may be independent variation in some aspects of women’s status under patriarchy; status in one sphere (work) may be unrelated to status in another sphere (home). The higher economic status of women will not always correspond to a favorable ideological position.

The economic power that individual women possess does not make them immune to violence, precisely because of the ideology at work in gendered relationships. Consider the situation of wife abuse. Income is logically related to rates of wife abuse because poorer women have fewer means to leave an abusive relationship (Rodgers, 1994). Although this structural observation seems intuitive, there may be a whole ideology at work in abusive relationships that both encourages violent behavior toward women and discourages women from escaping. Because many women are socialized to regard their relationships as a core element of their identity and self-worth, some women may strive to preserve relationships at any cost, even in abusive situations with economic avenues of escape (Ogle, Maier-Katkin, & Bernard, 1995).

Some feminists have been skeptical that efforts to obtain structural equality would reduce women’s vulnerability to violence (MacKinnon, 1983). Murray Bookchin (2005) doubted the efficacy of gender equality considering other systems of domination that eclipse women’s gains:

There is no reason to believe that a gender integrated police force—or for that matter a gender-integrated army, state bureaucracy, or corporate board of directors (given the very nature of these institutions as inherently hierarchical) would lead to a rational and ecological society. (p. 27)

Marxist feminists, too, maintain that under capitalism, sexist ideologies would persist in spite of greater gender equality (Jagger, 1983). A theory of violence against women necessitates that men’s dominance over women be understood in terms of wider matrixes of domination (Hill Collins, 1991) that contain both structural and ideological components.

An exclusive focus on structural gender inequality masks the ways in which male dominance is often dependent on ideologies. Moreover, although structural inequality and ideology are strongly related, and often mutually sustaining, they are not the same thing. Domination of women is not simply a matter of structure or achieving economic equality with men. Income equality is profoundly important and has obvious benefits. But structural inequality is only a feature of patriarchies. Inequality alone cannot account for patriarchal systems. Patriarchal ideologies can even “discount” some of the structural gains of women. In other words, gender ideology that favors gender inequality can diminish the strength of women’s structural gains (Blumberg, 1984).

### Hegemony

#### The pursuit of hegemony is not neutral – gender violence not only results from hegemonic projects, but is constitutive of them

Nayak & Suchland 6

(Meghana, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science at NYC, Jennifer, Ph.D. in Political Science and Government from The University of Texas at Austin, Volume 8, 2006 - Issue 4: Gender Violence and Hegemonic Projects, “Gender Violence And Hegemonic Projects,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616740600945024?scroll=top&needAccess=true>, Accessed: 7.11.17)VW

For example, current hegemonic practices of neoliberalism and neocolonialism circumscribe what democracy and rights are supposed to look like in terms of their appropriate forms and definitions, the legitimate actions taken in the name of democracy and rights as well as the parameters of justice and political participation. In this way, hegemonic actors (political elites and privileged activists for example) deflect criticism by feigning neutrality or ubiquity and, as we argue, require and shape discourses and practices of gender violence. While there may be identifiable actors, this does not mean that domination is suffi- ciently challenged by ‘cutting off the oppressor’s head’ because of how domination is imbricated in interpersonal, local, global, cultural, economic and social dynamics. As noted above, gender violence accomplishes certain things and fixes particular meanings and practices. Given that hegemonic projects also attempt to create a particular world of meaning and being, both gender violence and hegemonic projects can help each other ‘succeed’. Although it is not only the epistemic that generates hegemonic projects, we pay particular attention in this Special Issue to the hegemonic projects of ‘the state’. We do not conceive of the state as an actor but rather as an idea or what Pierre Bourdieu (1994) calls a ‘bureaucratic field’ that wields symbolic power and centralizes power. It is possible that the principal hegemonic project of the modern world is the project of ‘the state’. Our predominant focus on the state as a hegemonic project, then, is not to affirm state-centrism but to acknowledge that the state is still a central organizing political category of our lives. The politics of opposition, categories of identity and contemporary forms of domination work through the state in many ways. Our focus is on hegemonic projects – such as economic development (and its proxy neoliberalism), women’s rights activism, nation-building and national security – that are implicitly executed in the name of ‘the state’. These issues of gender, violence and power have been dealt with to some extent in feminist IR scholarship on the issues of gender, violence and power. Whereas traditional IR theory often views power as an ability to leverage material resources to get others to do what is not in their interests, feminists have exposed the gendered context of power thereby revealing more nuanced dimensions of hegemonic projects such as nationalism, militarism and globalization. The militarization of daily life when states promote military apparatuses as the solution for stability, security and development, the use of rape as a tool of war and the disproportionate effects of violence on particular women are three examples of a gendered conception of power (Enloe 2000; Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank 2000; Giles and Hyndman 2004). Feminist understandings of power have also exposed how gender is used to legitimize the operations of hegemonic projects. One example is the use of gendered conceptions of ‘protecting family and nation’ to promote military operations; another is the gender hierarchy that grounds, enables or cements the separation of public and private spheres (Peterson and Runyan 1998). While the issue of gender violence is indeed more prominent now because of the growth of feminist IR theory, we want to push for a further examination of the constitutive role gender violence plays in hegemonic projects. The scholarship on gender violence in IR certainly shows how hegemonic projects, such as nationalism or war, are deeply gendered and thus result in violence against women. But, while this vantage point is critical and often gets at the construction of gender, this framework generally only sees gender violence as primarily an example of hegemonic projects – one effect of power through the register of gender, rather than as contested, productive and coterminous with power. If we, as feminist theorists, respond to the obsessive focus on war in the mainstream IR field by documenting power relationships in terms of ‘Man’ over ‘Woman’/State over Citizen, we may inadvertently reaffirm understandings of violence as a ‘tool’ for particular goals of power. We acknowledge that power itself is an understudied political concept, particularly regarding the multiple and layered forms that it takes. It would be easy to set up the realist, masculinist conceptualization of power as a ‘strawperson’ against which to posit the importance of feminist scholarship. However, we are pushing for feminist intervention in various discussions of power, whether it takes the form of compulsory control over others, indirect control via institutions and rules, structural ‘constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation’, particularly in terms of ‘producing social positions of capital and labor’, or ‘the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 3– 4). Therefore, building on the work of feminist challenges to traditional IR views on power and of feminist scholarship on the gendered effects and production of various forms of power, we seek more nuanced understandings on this topic through the examination of the relationship between hegemony, gender and violence. It is often the case that the very contours of what constitutes gender violence in feminist IR scholarship are drawn by the issue of ‘violence against women’. Keck and Sikkink (1998) rightly explain how a transnational advocacy network actively developed the ‘violence against women’ frame, coalescing several campaigns worldwide into a platform that gets at the politics of pain which disproportionately targets women. The approach has raised awareness, galvanized support, given rise to much professional and political activity and enabled women’s groups to secure funding. But these political goals may have been secured at a certain cost. In the first place, the ‘violence against women’ approach relies on representational understandings of gender violence. In other words, the focus on violence against women also potentially ignores violence against men and against groups in ways that are gendered, raced and internationalized. For example, feminist IR scholars invoke the presumably disproportionate targeting of women during conflict in ways that emphasize particular gendered effects of conflict and the masculinized state; the general effect is the lack of due attention to what it means to ‘make’ gender through violence or to the way codes of masculinity negatively affect men. Second, we also note that responses to gender violence, in many ways more so than any other political category, have sanctified racism, imperialism and Orientalism among feminists and critical theorists. For example, the obsession with ‘Islamism’ as the explanation par excellence for gender troubles around the world as well as the romanticization and infantilization of indigenous and/or marginalized women, belie feminist concerns about hierarchy (Nayak 2006; Shepherd 2006). Feminists participate in these problematic discussions about gender violence when we presume that the only reason a woman may die elsewhere is because of her (monolithically) oppressive culture in contrast to the choices and freedom of women in the West. Ironically, it may be such limited understandings of gender violence that unintentionally keep the topic of gender on the sidelines of political science. If gender violence is just an effect of power and does not substantively contribute to how we understand the operations of power, then the issues that gender violence raises may be dismissed as ‘women’s issues’ rather than instrumental to knowledge in political science. This dynamic also increases the ghettoization of feminist IR scholarship and scholars (cf. Weber 1994).1 The current lacuna in IR scholarship on hegemony as well as on gender violence is not accidental but rather signals the production of knowledge in this field. Work on gender violence is not predominant in political science or the IR field precisely because it is conceived as ‘just’ violence against women. In other words, in order to further our understandings of violence, we must interrogate gender violence as constitutive of power, and to understand power, we must go beyond current understandings that see ‘it’ in terms of tools or phenomena that act on gender. And, as we do so, we simultaneously ask why the questions we examine in this Special Issue are left on the margins of scholarship. Thus, we come to the following: why does our argument that gender violence is more than a case study of the effects of hegemony and, rather, is constitutive of hegemonic projects, matter? By re-orienting the relationship between gender violence and hegemonic projects we challenge the ‘naturalness’ of the category of gender violence and assert it as constitutive of the productive forces of hegemonic projects. This framework provides a fresh and critical approach to understanding hegemonic projects and the construction of difference(s). We reference the work of postcolonial and critical race feminists who explain how neocolonial and neoimperial state formations are productive of and reliant upon gendered and racialized conceptualizations of citizens, immigrants and of ‘us/them’ dichotomies (McClintock 1995; Chatterjee and Jeganathan 2000; Stoler 2002). Postcolonial theory also explains how a fixation on violence ‘over there’ sidesteps how power works via international hierarchy (Chowdhry and Nair 2002). Similarly, we also believe that gender violence, rather than simply a result of war or culture, is vital and pivotal to the possibility of political violence and hegemony in the first place. Recent critical feminist engagements with international political economy (IPE) have also shown how the exploitation of women, and particularly women of color, is not simply an unintended consequence of global capitalism. Rather, the advancement of global capitalism under the dominant ideological rationale of neoliberalism depends on women’s secondary gendered status and global class hierarchy (Mies 1998; Peterson 2003; Agathangelou 2004). Drawing on these important literatures, we seek with this Special Issue to push the connections between gender violence and hegemonic projects beyond the ‘effects of power’ view towards an understanding that places the constitutive function of gender violence at the forefront.

Heg—military strategy where one country is more powerful.

Hegemonic ideology—that appears natural, inevitable and powerful, it defines just the way things are. Its not thought of an ideology but its thought of just the reality. Most people don’t think that nationalism—they think of the military as a necessary institution. You could say that military hegemony shouldn’t be understood as ideological hegemony. They mean dominance because of conotations of dominance and control but their ideology is hegemonic in other ways. Its ays militarization, patriarchy are all ingrained so people don’t think of them as ideological. They think of them as an objective.

Our alt is not about heg in the world—its about hegemony in debate

### JROTC

#### JROTC is terrible for women and is another attempt to militarize their labor and sexuality for the broader goals of the military

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Captain Ewell’s suggestion that people join the JROTC “really to meet girls” and his interaction with the young Latina who offered her reasons for joining is troubling on countless levels. His dismissive and explicitly sexist behavior was in sharp contrast with the more subtle ways that gender and sexuality shape interactions among students in the program. And although gender is often invoked to explain differences in leadership styles and success within JROTC, at Fairview High School sexuality and sexual desire are not invoked in explaining why kids should participate in JROTC. I have documented elsewhere, however, how politicians and other supporters of JROTC have cited fears of teenage pregnancy and female sexuality as a reason to support JROTC and specifically girls’ participation in the program (Pérez 2006). At Fairview, students are constantly reminded about the code of conduct governing their sexual behavior, particularly while in the cadet uniform, and how this allegedly sets them apart from noncadets at the school. Finally, while JROTC instructors highlight and encourage girls’ active participation and their value in JROTC, Captain Ewell’s comments effectively diminished their worth not only by reducing them to the sexual appeal they provide to entice young men into the program but also by emphasizing what feminist scholars, elected leaders, military officials, and civilians have noted, with alarm, about the military: that it is a hypermasculine space that fosters (at least until recently) the performance of compulsory heteronormativity, militarized patriarchy, and sexualized violence against women. Captain Ewell’s comments reflect what Cynthia Enloe has vigorously critiqued as the historic and contemporary tendency of the military and governments to utilize and “maneuver” women—through their productive labor, sexuality, and reproductive efforts—to advance military goals. See Enloe 2000.

### Militarization

#### The militarization of women doesn’t just occur on the battlefield but also in our living rooms and classrooms—the affirmatives attempt to maintain the military family is an inscription of women and children into a violent military that sacrifices their bodies for greater gains

Enloe ’00, Cynthia, “Maneuvers : The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives” <http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzQyMjYzX19BTg2?sid=03ac4e23-1039-4426-9f12-92995e01cbad@sessionmgr120&vid=0&format=EK&lpid=navPoint-14&rid=0//> PZ

Militarization does not always take on the guise of war. Much discussion of women and militarism occurs in times of open warfare—women in the Kosovo or Chechnyan wars, women during World War II, women in the American Civil War. As a result, even though the best of this research does indeed shed light on the home front’s transformation—and resistance to that transformation—it is easy to slip into imagining that militarization is always accompanied by government-directed overt violence, by war. Yet what the exploration of the lives of military wives and of women working as military prostitutes reveals for us is that militarization creeps into ordinary daily routines; it threads its way amid memos, laundry, lovemaking, and the clinking of frosted beer glasses. Militarization is such a pervasive process, and thus so hard to uproot, precisely because in its e veryday forms it scarcely looks life threatening.

It is by taking women’s experiences of militarization seriously, I think, that we are most likely to understand it fully. The militarization of women has been crucial for the militarization of governments and of international relations. The militarization of women has been necessary for the militarization of men. And because the militarization of women takes such humdrum forms, because it tends to insinuate itself into ordinary daily routines where it is rarely heralded or even deemed noteworthy, investigating the militarization of women can sharpen our sometimes dulled analytical skills.

Militarization is a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal. Militarization, that is, involves cultural as well as institutional, ideological, and economic transformations.2 To chart the spread of militarization, then, requires a host of skills: the ability to read budgets and interpret bureaucratic euphemisms, of course, but also the ability to understand the dynamics of memory, marriage, hero-worship, cinematic imagery, and the economies of commercialized sex.

Militarization is a complex process, frequently a contested one.

The reduction of militarism in some arenas can occur at the same time as its expansion in other arenas. Within the European Union (EU) today, for instance, militarization seems to be retreating and expanding simultaneously. On the one hand, European leaders on both the left and the center-right are hailing the closer integration of Europe’s once-rival states into an enlarged European Union as a movement that can guarantee regional peace. On the other hand, some of these same leaders are taking steps to create a military arm of the European Union, a new “Eurocorps” capable of acting separately from the United States, and are putting into place anti-immigration policies that some critics say are building a new “Fortress Europe.” The most starkly visible evidence of this version of an integrated Europe is the militarization of the EU’s borders: “The eastern borders of Germany, for instance, are patrolled by a double line of border guards using dogs, patrol boats, helicopters, radar, heat detectors and night vision. . . . While marine guards patrol the Spanish coastline, barbed wire, closed circuit TV and electronic monitoring are used to fortify the frontiers of the north African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.”24 This militarizing strategy is not without its gendered consequences. It appears to make the organized smuggling of women (thousands destined for EU brothels) across these fortified borders all the more profitable: pointing to the EU helicopters and patrol boats, smuggling syndicates raise their prices.25

In the United States as well, evidence shows that militarization has not been rolled back uniformly in the 1990s. The American media headlined the loss of defense manufacturing jobs and the closure of scores of military bases, but on other fronts, militarization moved forward apace. One of these fronts—most discussed among Latino community activists and among the advocates of immigrants’ rights—has been the increasing militarization of life along the U.S.-Mexican border. The Defense Department has become increasingly involved in the operations of not only the Justice Department’s Border Patrol but local police forces as well.26

Another front, not as likely to be a topic of American national political discourse, has been the post-Cold War militarizing trends that are occurring in public education. Local school board members, administrators, and teachers in towns across America today are weighing the advantages of militarizing local public education. In many towns, the proponents of militarized education have won those debates, though often over considerable opposition. In the United States in the mid-1990s, the fastest-growing program in the Department of Defense was the Junior Reserve Officer Training Program, or JROTC.

JROTC is a Pentagon-designed program of military training intended to be adopted by American high schools. By late 1995, Defense Department officials were allocating (with Congressional approval) $173 million to promoting high schools’ adoption of JROTC programs.27 Thousands of parents and high school administrators agreed that JROTC would enrich a school’s curriculum. By 1998, 330,000 American high school students, some as young as fourteen, were enrolled in JROTC.28 Twenty-six hundred high schools across the country were officially participating.29 School board members in southern states had become especially enthusiastic: by 1995, 65 percent of all the JROTC units were located in the south.

#### The military also has a terrible history of dealing with people whose sexualities and gender identities fall out of the scope of the heterosexual male— making the military more inclusive has only been successful at producing an image of the perfect soldier citizen

Enloe ’00, Cynthia, “Maneuvers : The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives” <http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzQyMjYzX19BTg2?sid=03ac4e23-1039-4426-9f12-92995e01cbad@sessionmgr120&vid=0&format=EK&lpid=navPoint-14&rid=0> //PZ

In some countries gay and lesbian activists have been among the most careful civilian monitors of their respective militaries. During the 1990s, these activists, perhaps more than the activists of any other movement, taught their fellow citizens much about the prevailing masculinized cultures in their governments’ militaries. There has been, nonetheless, an attendant risk in challenging the military at such close quarters. The militarization of the American gay and lesbian rights movement, one might argue, has become more intense, not less, in recent years. There is evidence that, to a lesser extent, so too has the militarization of its political counterpart in Britain.

The topic of gays in the military moved from being a little known fact of military life to being a touchstone of fin de siècle American politics. During World War II and the Vietnam War, those men and women who joined the military already conscious of their homosexuality or who, as so often happened, came to that consciousness only while serving in the military, coped privately or in small groups with those rules that made their sexuality a punishable offense. But by the late 1980s several widely reported court cases, plus increasingly public gay and lesbian organizing, had turned a once-private problem into a political issue.33

The 1992 campaign pledge of then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton to lift the existing ban on gay men and lesbians serving in the U.S. military was not the start of this politicizing process, but it did attract the attention of newspaper editors, television talk show hosts, members of Congress, lobbying groups, and ordinary voters who heretofore had paid little attention to military investigatory practices or the career paths of gay and lesbian soldiers.34

It is the very centrality of the military in American popular culture that has made it so hard for gay rights activists to avoid having their own campaign militarized. Here is the resultant dilemma: how do you campaign to allow gay men and lesbians to participate in soldiering without fostering the notion that soldiering is an exceptionally valued activity?

This dilemma is hardly new. Any group excluded from its country’s military, a military that possesses symbolic or actual policy-making power, has had to unravel this conundrum. Or, if the group chooses not to think about the puzzle, not to see itself as acting out a dilemma, then it is likely to become militarized through the very act of pressuring the military to open the doors a bit wider. When World War I began, the British and American women who were campaigning for the right to vote divided among themselves when they tried to figure out if “the right to serve” should be militarized so that women’s indispensability to their war-waging governments would have to be admitted. African American women and men from the American Revolution to the Gulf War have debated different approaches to resolving this dilemma. As recently as September 1995, the Congressional Black Caucus sponsored a celebration in Washington to honor African American veterans of the Korean War. Sanford Bishop, a black congressman from Georgia who was a member of both the Black Caucus and the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee, sent out a letter urging people to attend. He told his letter’s recipients, “We think it would be an excellent opportunity to call attention to the achievements of the U.S. military as a model of equal opportunity.”35 Similarly, South Africa’s newly empowered black women and men—including South Africa’s well-organized gay men and lesbians—have tried to reap the most valuable benefits of post-apartheid political inclusion without being insinuated into what some thought to be its most oppressive institutions.36 Is soldiering in the country’s reorganized military a distributor of valuable benefits or an instrument of oppression—or both?

Despite all this thoughtful discussion over several generations, the way out of the dilemma remains far from clear. The most optimistic calculation is to figure that when a country’s military admits a once excluded or despised group, that institution is transformed and made more compatible with democratic culture. In this perhaps too-sanguine scenario, the outsider group campaigning to enter the military doesn’t become militarized; rather, the newly diversified military becomes democratized.

The gays-in-the-military debate, as it has occurred in the 1990s United States, has highlighted the military’s reliance on ideas such as masculinity and heterosexism. Greater exposure has proved positive. Any debate that reveals the ideological foundation of a powerful institution is a valuable debate. But militarism itself has been scarcely disrupted. Perhaps its roots have been sent down even more deeply into the soil of American political culture. The reason lies in the way that soldiering was portrayed during the campaign. Soldiering for the state was—and still is—represented by many gay rights advocates as well as by heterosexism’s proponents as an activity that many of the country’s most talented, most selfless citizens want to do and should have the right to do. Soldiering as an activity and the soldier as a public figure may have gained, not lost, stature in U.S. political culture as a result of the 1990s gays-in-the-military debate.

The dynamics of the debate, however, have not had identical resonances for women and men. For lesbians and for women of all sexual orientations, this contention that soldiering and soldiers symbolize the best in citizenry has a special salience. First, in order to be taken seriously as full-fledged citizens, women of all races in the United States have had to form movements, lobby all levels of government, argue with fathers, brothers, and husbands. Any debate that has the effect of defining a “real” citizen is a debate that affects all women, whether they join in the arguments or not. Also, hundreds of women have been forced out of the U.S. military on grounds of homosexuality during witch-hunts—those systematic investigations designed to disclose the sexual preferences of scores of uniformed women simultaneously, usually by intimidating each woman to the point that she will reveal information about other women. These campaigns have had all the signs of being aimed at marginalizing women per se, not simply lesbian women.37 Thus even feminists whose political inclinations were anti-militarist found themselves outraged in the 1990s when stories of particular women discharged from their chosen profession gained public notoriety.

For instance, many feminists watched Barbra Streisand’s 1995 prime-time television docudrama of lesbian army colonel Margarethe Cammermeyer.38 The film “worked” for many viewers, even for many skeptical peace activist feminist viewers, not only because the relationship between Cammermeyer, a career army nurse in the Washington State National Guard, and her lover was portrayed with relative complexity and humanity, but also because the director and actors created a narrative that portrayed Cammermeyer as an asset to the military: she was dedicated, mature, disciplined, patriotic, skilled, and experienced. She was everything a modern military commander could wish for. It was patently unfair and irrational, the film’s plot implied, for this woman to be excluded from an institution to which she had devoted most of her adult life.

Off the film set and behind the scenes in the U.S. Justice Department, Attorney General Janet Reno seemed to agree. In the Justice Department offices, debates developed between Reno and her legal staff over whether to pursue Cammermeyer after a lower court had reinstated her in the military. Reno voiced the opinion that the federal government would look foolish if it entered an appeal; the lower court’s decision in favor of Cammermeyer should be allowed to stand. According to one of the Justice Department’s policy participants, Reno told her aides that “this woman is no threat to anyone.”39 In the end, however, the attorney general and her senior advisors concluded that they had to go ahead with the court appeal because to do otherwise would be to undercut the Clinton White House, which had spent so much of its political currency in 1993 crafting the revised anti-gay ban.40 The decision-making process that went on inside one federal department sheds some light on the myriad dynamics that can promote the militarization of civilian officials.

In the wake of the news stories, the published autobiography, the Streisand film, and the court cases, Colonel Cammermeyer continued to receive invitations to speak at colleges and high schools. She described her message as less about the value of military service, however, than about providing support for young gay men and lesbians. While her court appeals were pending, she continued to serve in the military, but she described the institution by saying, “The military isn’t good about dealing with the realities of sexuality, either heterosexual or homosexual.”41

Issue definitions in American political life are not easy to control in this day of fiercely competitive media. One of the principal dynamics that has militarized the gays-in-the-military issue in the United States has been the pressuring of advocates to offer up to the media those gay and lesbian soldiers in whom mainstream media producers and editors can find no fault on any grounds other than their violation of the government’s homosexual ban. Presenting gay and lesbian soldiers as paragons of soldierly virtue consequently became the strategy chosen by activists for exposing the utter irrationality of the Defense Department’s ban. It was an effective strategy: it narrowed the terms of political debate, and it convinced many American citizens who had no personal stake in gay rights.

This strategy, however, also had other consequences. The very confines and contours of the resultant public debate made it seem as if the highest caliber of American citizens were those who chose the military as their career. These lesbian and gay model soldiers took on the status of paragons of citizenship. They could have been architects or social workers, carpenters or journalists, yet instead they chose to be professional soldiers. In so doing, the anti-ban debaters implied, these soldiers had a better chance than any of their civilian compatriots did of performing a valued service to their nation. During 1993, as these lesbian women and gay men gained national recognition through their exemplary soldiering, as their merits and patriotism became the focus of congressional hearings and nighttime television shows, perhaps homophobia did recede in American culture. But militarization advanced.

### STEM

#### Assumptions that science can “get better” is ignorant of the culture of white, middle-class, heterosexual, and masculine world views imbued in science education that continues today

Barton ’98, Professor of Science Education at Michigan State University, (Angela, “Liberatory Science Education: Weaving Connections between Feminist Theory and Science,” Curriculum Inquiry, Vol. 27, No. 2, (Summer, 1997), pp. 141-163 //PZ

Research in science education suggests that large numbers of students, particularly females, feel alienated from science and develop low self- esteem and confidence in science beginning as early as elementary school (Mullis and Jenkins 1988; Kahle and Meece 1994). Students of science believe that science is dull, not a part of their lives outside of the classroom, and meant for only the intellectual elite. Once students reach high school or college, most admit that they enroll in science courses only because such courses are either required for college admission or for their college major, not because they are interested in learning the actual science. Over the past thirty years, the women's movement has had a significant influence on many of the policies and practices guiding the education of women in science. Before the women's movement resurfaced in the 1960s, rampant discrimination against girls in schools was common (Kahle 1985; Kelly 1985). Little or no opportunity for girls to advance in science existed; teacher support, encouragement, attention, after-school activities, role models, and peer support were reserved for boys (Matyas 1985; Smail 1985). If a girl wanted to pursue science, chances were she was discouraged away from science and tracked into school programs designed to prepare her for the more traditional female roles of secretaries, housewives, housekeepers, nurses, and elementary school teachers (Gaskell 1992). In the 1960s, the work of academic and political feminists provided new interpretations of girls' experiences in school science, and as a result, a wide variety of school science activities, special programs for girls in science, and role model programs were developed (Kahle 1985; Kelly 1985; Matyas 1985; Smail 1985; Whyte 1986). Although these programs, along with the growing awareness and concern for the issue of women in science, have influenced the achievement of girls in school science in North America, Western Europe, and Australia, statistics indicate that girls' academic achievement and participation in science still trail white, middle-class boys' (Mullis and Jenkins 1988; Kahle and Meece 1994; Young and Fraser 1994). The science education communities, in response to such inequities, have concentrated efforts to construct and promote conceptual understanding for all students in science (Osbourne and Freyberg 1985; Ogawa 1986; American Association for the Advancement of Science 1989; Harlen 1989; Rosebery, Warren, and Conant 1990; Anderson 1991). The resulting reform movements generally known as "teaching for conceptual understanding" are based on the theoretical position that science is a socially constructed discipline" with its own ways of talking, reasoning, acting, its own norms, beliefs and values, its own institutions, its shared history and even its shared mythologies, rather than the acquisition of specific facts and procedures" (Rosebery, Warren, and Conant 1990, 3). This vision of science education promotes the idea that because science is socially con- structed, teachers need to enter the teaching profession with detailed knowl- edge of subject matter and students in order to engage diverse students in meaningful and participatory learning. Calls for reform suggest that teachers need to know more than what is conventionally included in the school curriculum facts, theories, and procedures fundamental to their subject matter expertise. Teachers need to have a thorough understanding of science, including its content, culture, and discursive practices, and an understanding of students and educational processes, so that they can provide opportunities for personally relevant engagement in science by students with diverse backgrounds. As Wilson and Sykes (1989) argue, because educational communities are seeking to reach across race and class lines, teachers need to be able to move back and forth between a diversity of student understandings and experiences and a deeper and more connected understanding of the subject matter. Without this exten- sive knowledge of students or of subject matter, teachers will lack the ability to construct and implement a compelling repertoire of teaching activities needed to help students conceptually understand the knowledge base of science. The teaching for understanding movements have pushed at the bound- aries of the traditional discourse surrounding teacher knowledge by argu- ing that teachers need to have a thorough understanding of the content, culture, and discursive practices of science if they are to help students develop conceptual understandings in science. Feminist interpretations of teaching for understanding agree that these new emphases are important, but suggest that their importance lies in more than conceptual understand- ing for all. Rather, it is important to make explicit the content, culture, and discursive practices in science class so that students and teachers have a basis from which to understand and critique the knowledge base of sci- ence. It is from this perspective that the following questions can be asked: What is the purpose of teaching science to students, if the result is that they understand it, but remain oppressed by it? Can students be taught to understand the content, culture, and practice of science, including its hidden agenda? In other words, do teachers teach a science that has been constructed within and that helps promote a limited ideology, or do they work to rebuild that science and include the perspective of women and minorities as one way to begin building a science of the future? Feminist theorists have suggested that the absence of women in science cannot be completely solved by providing school girls with more exposure to science or even by simply acknowledging that science is socially constructed, as reform efforts have historically attempted. Instead, such theorists argue that the history of women's participation in science, a participation marred by the silencing of women as scientific researchers, teachers, and learners has resulted in a masculine construction of science (Keller 1985; This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Thu, 22 Jun 2017 20:52:29 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 146 ANGELA CALABRESE BARTON Bleier 1986; Harding 1986, 1991; Longino 1989). Even more, because of the hierarchical positioning of science in a raced, classed, and gendered Western world, many feminist theorists extend their argument to include the notion that science has also been constructed around white, middle and upper-class work and family values (Harding 1991). In other words, the political and social efforts of the past two centuries to limit the representation of women and minorities in Western science have resulted in a scientific culture imbued with a set of norms and values that conform to white, middle-class, heterosexual, and masculine world views (Longino 1989). This argument lends a new perspective to the interpretation of school efforts to make science education inclusive.

#### Science education has constantly reproduced instances of sexism in the academy—only an intersection of feminist pedagogy and science can solve for the barriers that status quo education propogates

Raven ’13, Assistant professor and PhD student at the School of Teaching Learning and Curriculum Studies, University of Georgia, (Sara, Wanted: The Intersection of Feminist Pedagogy andScience Education,” International Journal of gender science and technology, http://genderandset.open.ac.uk/index.php/genderandset/article/viewFile/356/596)

Feminist pedagogy creates leaders by empowering students to be active participants in their education. The feminist teacher is not merely a fount of knowledge out of which information pours from teacher to students. She is a role model, and a guide to feminist pedagogy and, above all, action. Feminist teachers are not only instructors: they are activists. Kathleen Dunn (1987) took an alternative approach to analyzing feminist pedagogy by focusing on students. Using a psychological approach, she theorized that there are three barriers to learning that are often confronted in women’s studies classrooms. The intuitive/affective barrier occurs when a student is afraid that her answer to a question or response on an assignment is incorrect. As her anxiety increases, her understanding of the subject matter lessens. Ethical barriers are raised as students withdraw from learning environments that challenge their current value systems. Women’s studies material often provokes this reaction simply because of the nature of feminist thought. For anyone taking their first women’s studies class, the reaction is jarring, as the coursework often challenges traditional value systems in which many women and men have been raised. Finally, critical/logical barriers are raised when new information fails to fit into existing thought structures. This is slightly different from an ethical barrier, as the thought structure does not rely on a value system, but rather on existing paradigms. For instance, going from a positivist to a feminist perspective is not a change in values. Rather, it is a shift in conceptual paradigms. When a critical/logical barrier is raised, the student can experience cognitive dissonance and either stop paying attention to the course material while trying to fit the information into her pre-existing thought structure, or give up on learning the material completely. Ideally, the cognitive dissonance is eventually resolved, and results in an individual paradigm shift. However, whether or not this happens depends on the classroom, the teacher, and the student. International Journal of Gender, Science and Technology, Vol.6, No.2 247 Many feminist pedagogy techniques can be incorporated into science education, though perhaps the most important implication relates to how we view education. During my time as a science education student, I was often asked for my opinion on a subject, but rarely was I pushed to examine why I think the way that I do. I believe that this is an integral difference, and connects to Kathleen Dunn’s (1987) theory of intellectual barriers, because although identifying the above-mentioned barriers is important, I find that what is even more important is promoting a learning environment that confronts these barriers. Thomas Kuhn (1970), in his seminal work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, wrote about paradigm shifts, which occur when one system of knowledge is replaced by another. Kuhn was referring to scientific revolutions, but such paradigm shifts can occur within an individual. Confronting intuitive, ethical, and cognitive barriers can result in these shifts. Often times, the most productive learning occurs during these shifts. By utilizing Shrewsbury’s (1987) feminist pedagogy in science education courses, students and instructors can approach and break down these barriers in more productive ways. FEMINIST SCIENCE EDUCATION Science and science education represent a way of knowing and learning that can all too often seem one-sided and black-and-white. What does a field with very few women and very few ethnic minorities in it say to a student who is a part of these groups? It says that this is not your subject, this is not your strength, and this is not your place. How knowledge is learned, used, and understood is essential to science and science education. Additionally, knowledge production can be very variable and individual. Being female represents a very different experience of schooling than being male, as does being black instead of white, and poor instead of rich. These are all qualifiers of identity that do more than categorize: they shape and affect identity and experience. Knowledge production is a part of these identity markers, and feminist epistemology gives science educators a way of accounting for identity and context in schools without brushing the issue aside and feigning ignorance. We study gender in science education and feminist epistemology to counter this line of thinking, to empower women and other minorities to learn and grow in science, and to create a future in science that is better balanced and more equal than in any previous generation. Although women’s inequality in the sciences has persisted, as discussed earlier, the treatment and representation of women in science has positively improved over time. Women now earn more than half of U.S. bachelor’s degrees and 44% of master’s and doctoral degrees across all science and engineering fields, and women’s participation in STEM employment continues to grow (National Science Foundation, 2011). These gains are important, but are only part of the solution, as science is still characterized as a male subject. Women can do everything in their power to break into science, but it is up to feminist epistemologists and feminist science educators to alter the system and change our approach to science by changing the view that knowledge is male or resides solely in the mind; by acknowledging the political and contextual milieu that exists in every facet of science knowledge production; and by making sure that students appreciate that understanding is one-dimensional without situating it in a context. International Journal of Gender, Science and Technology, Vol.6, No.2 248 In accomplishing these goals, feminist science educators and scholars can create a new era of science that is culturally and historically significant and responsible.

## K Links

### Western Philosophy (general)

#### Educational structures as well as epistemologies have historically excluded women—Aristotle and other Western philosophers have theorized explicitly sexist modes of education which should be rejected

Khattak 2011

Shamaas Gul Khattak (School of Arts and Education, Middlesex University). “Feminism in Education: Historical and Contemporary Issues of Gender Inequality in Higher Education.” November 2011. [http://www.mdx.ac.uk/\_\_data/assets/pdf\_file/0010/50050/Shamaass\_Gul\_Khattak.pdf //](http://www.mdx.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/50050/Shamaass_Gul_Khattak.pdf%20//) PZ

In a sense, the presence of men depends on the absence of women. Because of this independence, gender analysis of women’s lives and experiences does not simply ‘add something’ about women but transforms what we know about men and the activities they undertake (Francis and Skelton, 2001). Gender shapes not only how we identify ourselves but also how other identify and relates to us and how we are positioned within social structures. The position of femininity in the society is promoting gender issues that people have set paradigms regarding femininity and women role in the society (Weiner, 2000). Education, particularly higher education, [arguably] undermines women traditional role (i.e. childbearing, emotional-caretaking and physical maintenance of household) because education [for women] is considered a ladder to independence. A number of institutions play a part in the production and reproduction of gender inequality—be it at a material or an ideological level. According to ADB (2000) and Archer (2003), both the family and the media work at an ideological level [thereby] perpetuating inequality of the sexes, while employers who pay lower wages to female workers perpetuate inequality at a material level. But an institution which many sociologists have regarded as central in perpetuating inequality and, [yet] central in potentially eliminating inequality is education (Thomas, 1999). From the nineteenth-century reformers who pressed for universal schooling are today advocating an increase in the number of girls in all levels of education (as well as fighting for improvement in their choice of available subjects and careers). Education therefore continues to be a battleground in the struggle for equality of opportunity. Conceptualization of gender issues: historical perspectives on women and the opportunities offered to them by higher education Gender is considered an appropriate predictor of life events (Baron, 2004). Preindustrial societies were characterised by high infant mortality rates combined with low life expectancy and a social belief in the value of large families. In such a context, many women were pre-occupied with rearing children for a greater part of their lives. Such gender role allocation typically has the support of religious and moral codes and is enforced by institutionalised authority structures (Baron, 2004). An examination of evolution of women’s higher education opportunities reveals that ‘women have struggled for centuries to gain access to higher education as both students and scholars’ (Lie and O’Leary, 2000, p. 17). The rationale of their exclusion from learning has centred on their supposed inferior intellectual ability. Women’s lack of participation in the educational process can be traced back to ancient times. Aristotle claimed that ‘in comparison to men, women were biologically defective, which rendered them morally and intellectually inferior. To this end, women were not creative and thus their souls were incapable of reaching the last stage of reason, therefore as they had underdeveloped brains women could not be educated’ (cited in Lie and O’Leary, 2000, p. 17). This view reflected a general belief, even though there were important arguments rejecting this idea, e.g., Plato’s Republic (See Allen, 2006 and Bloon, 1968). History, in Lie and O’Leary’s (2000) opinion, is replete with more recent versions of this Aristotelian argument. The French philosopher, Rousseau, in the late 1700 expressed an opinion on the education of women, which typifies this view— the attitude that many educated men have even today. According to Martian (1984, p.340), ‘The whole education of women ought to be relative to men. To please them, to be useful to them, to make themselves loved and channelled by them, to educate them when young, to care for them while growing, to counsel them, to console them and to make life sweet and agreeable to them from their infancy’. Although there is historical evidence of educated and creative women, they are the exception rather than the rule. For a period of nearly nine hundred years, female scholars were to be found in India during the Vedic period (1500 to 600 BC), where sons and daughters had equal opportunity for education (Lie and O’Leary, 2000, p. 179). It was, therefore, not unusual to find in Vedic society to find women teachers, philosophers and poets (Thapar, 1966). However, this equality ended during the post-Vedic period from 500 BC to 500 AD, when the caste system in India became firmly entrenched. This development marked a deterioration in the status of women—they were treated inferiorly compared to men, as Thapar (1966, p.179) noted: ‘In general, there were relatively few educated women before the last century although some women in certain cultures were included in mainstream education and learning under certain conditions; their inclusion in it was the exception rather than the rule

## Impacts

### Outweighs war and warming

#### Patriarchy is a dysfunctional system that justifies violence against feminine bodies, exploitation of the earth, and a normalization of war, which future life on earth impossible

**Warren and Cady, Professors of Philosophy at Macalester College & Hamline University, 1994**

(Karen and Duane, Hypatia, Spring, Proquest)

The notion of patriarchy as a socially dysfunctional system enables feminist philosophers to show why conceptual connections are so important and how conceptual connections are linked to the variety of other sorts of woman-nature-peace connections. In addition, the claim that patriarchy is a dysfunctional social system locates what ecofeminists see as various "dysfunctionalities" of patriarchy-the empirical invisibility of what women do, sexist-warist- language, violence toward women, other cultures, and nature-in a historical, socioeconomic, cultural, and political context.(10) To say that patriarchy is a dysfunctional system is to say that the fundamental beliefs, values, attitudes and assumptions (conceptual framework) of patriarchy give rise to impaired thinking, behaviors, and institutions which are unhealthy for humans, especially women, and the planet. The following diagram represents the features of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system: Patriarchy, as an Up-Down system of power-over relationships of domination of women by men, is conceptually grounded in a faulty patriarchal belief and value system, (a), according to which (some) men are rational and women are not rational, or at least not rational in the more highly valued way (some) men are rational; reason and mind are more important than emotion and body; that humans are justified in using female nature simply to satisfy human consumptive needs. The discussion above of patriarchal conceptual frameworks describes the characteristics of this faulty belief system. Patriarchal conceptual frameworks sanction, maintain, and perpetuate impaired thinking, (b): For example, that men can control women's inner lives, that it is men's role to determine women's choices, that human superiority over nature justifies human exploitation of nature, that women are closer to nature than men because they are less rational, more emotional, and respond in more instinctual ways than (dominant) men. The discussions above at (4) and (5), are examples of the linguistic and psychological forms such impaired thinking can take. Operationalized, the evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise, (c), and the unmanageability, (d), which results. For example, in the United States, current estimates are that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she knows; globally, rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic ography are examples of behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy. In the realm of environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that it is "man's God-given right" to have dominion (that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental value, that environmental destruction is the acceptable price we pay for "progress." And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural, righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability. Much of the current "unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically male-gender-identified beliefs,… values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors--the symptoms of dysfunctionality--that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is--as a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy.(11) The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature (see Russell 1989, 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "a militarism and warfare are continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth" (Spretnak 1989, 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if continued, will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible. It is a stark message, but it is plausible. Its plausibility lies in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional, national, and global contexts.

#### Violence should be understood as a continuum that functions against all women. This sexual terrorism has become the norm where women’s bodies are the battlefield. Prioritize these forms of violence because social biases underrepresent them and their effects are exponential. Their focus on large scale impacts ignore these types of low level violence that will continue to happen.

**Ray in 1997**

A. E. Ray “The Shame of it: gender-based terrorism in the former Yugoslavia and the failureof international human rights law to comprehend the injuries.” The American University Law Review. Vol 46.

In order to reach all of the violence perpetrated against the women of the former Yugoslavia that is not committed by soldiers or other officials of the state, human lights law must move beyond its artificially constructed barriers between "public" and "private" actions: A feminist perspective on human rights would require a rethinking of the notions of imputability and state responsibility and in this sense would challenge the most basic assumptions of international law. If violence against women were considered by the international legal system to be as shocking as violence against people for their political ideas, women would have considerable support in their struggle.... The assumption that underlies all law, including international human rights law, is that the public/private distinction is real: human society, human lives can be separated into two distinct spheres. This division, however, is an ideological construct rationalizing the exclusion of women from the sources of power. 2 6 The international community must recognize that violence against women is always political, regardless of where it occurs, because it affects the way women view themselves and their role in the world, as well as the lives they lead in the so-called public sphere. 2 6 ' When women are silenced within the family, their silence is not restricted to the private realm, but rather affects their voice in the public realm as well, often assuring their silence in any environment. 262 For women in the former Yugoslavia, as well as for all women, extension beyond the various public/private barriers is imperative if human rights law "is to have meaning for women brutalized in less-known theaters of war or in the by-ways of daily life." 63 Because, as currently constructed, human rights laws can reach only individual perpetrators during times of war, one alternative is to reconsider our understanding of what constitutes "war" and what constitutes "peace. " " When it is universally true that no matter where in the world a woman lives or with what culture she identifies, she is at grave risk of being beaten, imprisoned, enslaved, raped, prostituted, physically tortured, and murdered simply because she is a woman, the term "peace" does not describe her existence. 2 5 In addition to being persecuted for being a woman, many women also are persecuted on ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Therefore, it is crucial that our re-conceptualization of human rights is not limited to violations based on gender." Rather, our definitions of "war" and "peace" in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups should be questioned. Nevertheless, in every culture a common risk factor is being a woman, and to describe the conditions of our lives as "peace" is to deny the effect of sexual terrorism on all women. 6 7 Because we are socialized to think of times of "war" as limited to groups of men fighting over physical territory or land, we do not immediately consider the possibility of "war" outside this narrow definition except in a metaphorical sense, such as in the expression "the war against poverty." However, the physical violence and sex discrimination perpetrated against women because we are women is hardly metaphorical. Despite the fact that its prevalence makes the violence seem natural or inevitable, it is profoundly political in both its purpose and its effect. Further, its exclusion from international human rights law is no accident, but rather part of a system politically constructed to exclude and silence women. 2 6 The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality. 2 6 9 Women's bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated, as well as the objects through which men's honor is attained or taken away in many cultures.Y Thus, when a man wants to communicate that he is more powerful than a woman, he may beat her. When a man wants to communicate that a woman is his to use as he pleases, he may rape her or prostitute her. The objectification of women is so universal that when one country ruled by men (Serbia) wants to communicate to another country ruled by men (Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia) that it is superior and more powerful, it rapes, tortures, and prostitutes the "inferior" country's women. 2 71 The use of the possessive is intentional, for communication among men through the abuse of women is effective only to the extent that the group of men to whom the message is sent believes they have some right of possession over the bodies of the women used. Unless they have some claim of right to what is taken, no injury is experienced. Of course, regardless of whether a group of men sexually terrorizing a group of women is trying to communicate a message to another group of men, the universal sexual victimization of women clearly communicates to all women a message of dominance and ownership over women. As Charlotte Bunch explains, "The physical territory of [the] political struggle [over female subordination] is women's bodies." 7 2

### Hegemonic Masculinity

#### Hegemonic masculinity structures tiers of power relations—this is the foundation for oppression based on gender, age, class, sexuality, and race

Collins ’04, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, ( Patricia Hill, “ Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism,” Routledge, <https://barzakhlentini.noblogs.org/files/2013/09/black-sexual-politics.pdf>) // PZ

Tarzan constitutes one well-known example of how mass media shapes White masculinity within U.S. society. The construction of White masculinity is not confined to fictional images. Whether the composition of the U.S. Senate or executives of global corporations or an American literary canon that glorifies the exploits of pioneers and patriots, elite White men run America. It doesn’t matter that, to paraphrase the title of a Hollywood film of the same name, “White men can’t jump,” because they can make others jump for them. Moreover, because this group so dominates positions of power and authority, the view of masculinity patterned on Tarzan, U.S. senators, corporate executives, and cowboys is well known and is often taken as normal, natural, and ideal. It becomes hegemonic in that the vast majority of the population accepts ideas about gender complementarity that privilege the masculinity of propertied, heterosexual White men as natural, normal, and beyond reproach. 12 In this fashion, elite White men control the very definitions of masculinity, and they use these standards to evaluate their own masculine identities and those of all other men, including African American men. Hegemonic masculinity is fundamentally a dynamic, relational construct. 13 Because it is constantly tested by the behaviors of others, such masculinity must always be achieved. These relations are not merely interconnected; they reflect the hierarchal power relations of a racialized system of sexism that frames the multiple expressions of masculinity and femininity available to African American men and women, as well as all other groups. In the American context, hegemonic masculinity becomes defined through its difference from and opposition to women, boys, poor and working class men of all races and ethnicities, gay men, and Black men. 14 In other words, hegemonic masculinity is a concept that is shaped by ideologies of gender, age, class, sexuality, and race. Ideas about groups formed within these ideologies, for example, women or LGBT people, constitute an important benchmark for defining a hegemonic masculinity that must constantly construct itself. Without these groups as ideological markers, hegemonic masculinity becomes meaningless. In the United States, hegemonic masculinity is installed at the top of a hierarchical array of masculinities. All other masculinities, including those of African American men, are evaluated by how closely they approximate dominant social norms. Masculinity itself becomes organized as a three-tiered structure: those closest to hegemonic masculinity, predominantly wealthy White men, but not exclusively so, retain the most power at the top; those men who are situated just below have greater access to White male power, yet remain marginalized (for example, working-class White men and Latino, Asian, and White immigrant men); and those males who are subordinated by both of these groups occupy the bottom (for example, Black men and men from indigenous groups). Moreover, hegemonic masculinity requires these marginalized and subordinated masculinities. Men from varying races, classes, and sexualities jockey for position within this hierarchy of masculinities. For example, like African American men, the vast majority of Latino and Asian American men are excluded from the category of hegemonic masculinity. Instead, they are assigned social scripts of marginalized masculinities, the former because of dedication to family and the latter due to representations of hard work and being a “model minority.” Those Latino and Asian American men who falter can be demoted to the subordinated masculinity reserved for African American men. Those who manage to approximate the norms of hegemonic masculinity may enter the inner circle, often as “honorary” elite White men. Not surprisingly, this hierarchy of successful and failed manhood matches up to the White normality/Black deviancy framework that accompanies racism; the heterosexual/homosexual binary that supports heterosexism; structures of age that grant seniority to older males over younger ones; and a class system that grants propertied individuals more power and status than those who lack it. It is important to stress that all women occupy the category of devalued Other that gives meaning to all masculinities. Yet, just as masculinities are simultaneously constructed in relation to one another and hierarchically related, femininities demonstrate a similar pattern. Within these crosscutting relationships, Latina, Asian, and Black women routinely inherit social scripts of marginalized and/or subordinated femininities. For example, one study of representations of Latina and Black women in fiction and of Latinas and Blacks who had careers in Hollywood films finds similarities in treatment that illuminate how marginalized and subordinated femininities are constructed. 15 Latinas are routinely presented as members of a conquered people whereas Black women appear as slaves. In this regard, both groups of women symbolize subordinated femininities and share the status of sexual outlaws: “the Latina of conquest fiction is portrayed as the half-breed harlot whose purpose is to pique the male sexual appetite and whose mixed blood elicits similar behavior to that of her Black counterpart, the mulatto.” 16 Thus, within hierarchies of femininity, social categories of race, age, and sexual orientation also intersect to produce comparable categories of hegemonic, marginalized, and subordinated femininities.

## Framework

#### The alternative is a prior question-- before we can engage in political and civil discourse about the impacts of the affirmative we must use feminist pedagogy to break down the notions of civility that plague the debate community

Lozano-Reich & Cloud ‘9, Assistant Professor at Loyola Marymount University and Associate Professor at The University of Texas respectively, (Nina Lozano-Reich & Dana Cloud, “The Uncivil Tongue: Invitational Rhetoric and the Problem of Inequality,” *Western Journal of Communication*, pp. 220-226

Bone et al. acknowledge that historically, societal standards of decorum have often been used to silence groups and keep them in their place. Nowhere is this truer than in the case of women, told to play nice with their oppressors (Ehrenreich & English, 2005). But the authors contradict this position when they argue, ‘‘When we adopt an invitational approach and are civil [emphasis added], the potential for grief and violence is minimized’’ (p. 457). Likewise, they write, ‘‘Civility ... can be understood as an ... integral component of democracy’’ (p. 457). Based upon historical and contemporary examples, we reject these claims; when theorizing as to how individuals should deal with ‘‘difficult situations,’’ our authors’ call for adopting an invitational paradigm grounded in civility is not only antithetical to the goals of invitational rhetoric, but also in combating systems of oppression. Historically, dominant groups have repeatedly enacted civilizing strategies to effectively silence and punish marginalized groups (e.g., labor; women and people of color; the poor; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender [LGBT] people). Indeed, 19th-century notions of propriety and civility were used as cultural ideals to place legal, political, and physical restrictions on women—whereby relegating women to the private sphere (Oravec, 2003). Antifeminists frequently appealed to masculine norms of ‘‘civilization’’ to ‘‘depict women as less civilized than men, less able to contribute to the advancement of the race’’ (Bederman, 1995, p. 121). Extending this history, women of color have been silenced through civilizing strategies that deem legitimately angry speech to be ‘‘uppity’’ ‘‘or ‘‘illiterate’’ (Anzaldu´ a, 1999; hooks, 1989). It has taken decades of critical feminist scholarship to resist politics of civility and overcome oppressive stereotypes so that women of color can be viewed as speaking subjects, and not as uncivilized subjects needing a firm hand. Similarly, LGBTQ sexual practices have also been vulnerable to oppressive charges of indecorum. Culturally, dominant sexual ethics and decorous community standards function to shame queer individuals, and stigmatize nonnormative acts of sexuality (Morris & Sloop, 2006; Warner, 1999). One need only look to hate crimes enacted upon gays or immigrants, or acts of femicide inflicted upon women who dare to speak out. Clearly, a move towards civility in relation to oppressed groups may potentially increase grief and violence. Bone et al. claim that civility fosters democracy. While voting is indeed civil, radical social change has not occurred in voting booths, but results, instead, from democratic grassroots tactics. Protestors inherently do not operate within the realm of decorum. Indeed, political confrontations up to and including violence have been perennial resources in struggles for justice (Kirkpatrick, 2008). The civility standard is detrimental to this project. When measured by standards of civility, protesters are framed as wild and riotous by dominant media, rendering their struggles illegitimate (Gitlin, 2003). In a post-9=11 climate, moreover, ‘‘uncivil’’ protestors are equated with terrorists (and terrorists cannot be ascribed any rationality whatsoever). Bederman (1995) asks whether conforming to mainstream standards of civility replaces one kind of exclusion with another. This paradox holds except in cases of discourses among equals. Discourses of civilization ‘‘have proven [to be] a slippery slope for those who dream of a more just society’’ (Bederman, 1995, p. 239). Likewise, Mayo (2002) argues that ‘‘civility is a form of social discrimination, for it is predicated on making distinctions that support accepted practices and values, and entails enacting those distinctions to the detriment of the purportedly uncivil’’ (p. 82). In other words, we view Bone et al.’s argument for invitational civility in situations of conflict as potentially perpetuating discrimination in the name of peace. Theorizing resistance to oppression requires attention to both invitation and confrontation, along with criteria enabling critics to evaluate both modes. Consequently, we believe it is irresponsible to displace more confrontational models for social change in favor of a politics of civility that has been proven to leave those already disempowered in a continued state of conformity, punishment, and/or silence. Civility, in short, should not be advocated as a stance for feminists or others struggling for change. Although beyond the scope of this brief response to present a complete theorization of when and under what conditions invitational, civil discourse provides an ethically desirable stance, we have attempted here to posit equality as the necessary prerequisite (not outcome) for a productive invitational, civil discourse. Bone et al.’s defense of invitational rhetoric begs the question of when invitation and civility are functional for the oppressed and when they are not. We contend that defending invitational rhetoric in conditions of antagonism is fraught 224 N. M. Lozano-Reich and D. L. Cloud with contradictions exposed in exploration of the historical uses of ‘‘civility’’ to discipline women and Others. Unfortunately, invitation and civility are as likely to be bludgeons of the oppressor as resources for the oppressed. Further conversation about the merits of invitational rhetoric must grapple with this contradiction. The cause of justice may not need a theory of invitation but rather a theory of the uncivil tongue.

#### Everyone is aware that sexism exists in the debate community but all too often the tendency is to say “lets solve that later”. The ballot is a refusal to sideline an issue that we so desperately need to address

Poapst & Harper ’17, Department of Communication, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA; Department of Communication, Samford University, Birmingham, AL, USA, (Jackie and Allison, “Reflections on the 2014 celebration of women in debate tournament at George Mason University,” *Argument and Advocacy*, vol. 53, no. 2, 127–137 // PZ

This tactic of mansplaining can be understood theoretically in the context of our earlier discussion of dominant communication and muted groups. First, mansplaining is an obvious means of disrespecting the speech of women on a particular issue or topic. ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY 133 Second, mansplaining tactics were used in this specific case to suggest that the masculine perspective on debate still defined the dominant norms of communication. In turning to the comments about a West Coast version of the tournament, respondents in this case shifted the focus away from support for the original idea to another solution presumably “down the pipeline.” While these comments may have been well intentioned, the result was still problematic. Readers may have been led to believe that there would be another, more convenient version of this tournament at a later date, which made participating in the tournament at George Mason unnecessary. Unfortunately, this West Coast version of this tournament never came to fruition, but this misplaced hope may have hurt attendance at the George Mason tournament. Our community seems to thrive on postponing action to a later date in the hopes that the future holds out hope for a better solution. Indeed, debaters are taught to advocate just such a position in policy debate. However, it is important to recognize that, in the meantime, things are not getting any better. Sexism is still rampant on college campuses. One in five women on college campuses report being sexually assaulted, and sexual misconduct is still a big problem at American colleges and universities (Cantor et al. 2015). Within the debate community itself, there is widespread discontent with how women debaters are treated, and there is evidence of gender discrimination not only against female debaters but female judges. For example, female judges are typically ranked significantly lower than male judges on lists of preferred judges in policy debate (Harper, McVey, and Poapst 2013). The problems for women in the debate community are many, and it is no longer acceptable to say “let’s solve the problem later.” Another common theme in social media posts about the George Mason tournament were messages of support and promises to attend from individuals who did not end up participating. This also was reflected in fluctuating registration numbers leading up to the tournament. Half of the individuals who said they planned to attend on one particular Facebook thread ended up not attending. Similarly, while the tournament at one point had more than 20 teams registered to attend, only seven teams ended up debating at the tournament. This failure to follow through is an example of the “slacktivism” that is too often at play on social media. It is easy to “like” a call to activism on Facebook, but realworld activism requires time, effort, and money on behalf of the cause. David Carr explains, “Sometimes, it may be as simple as trying to impress their online friends, and once you have fashioned that identity, there is very little reason to actually do anything else.” This shift toward feel-good support measures can often trade off with true support of social campaigns, which is “an important distinction in an age when you can accumulate social currency on Facebook or Twitter just by hitting the “like” or “favorite” button” (Carr 2012). If members of the policy debate community really hope make debate more inclusive, we must realize that the time has come to move beyond discussion and debates and take concrete action. Not surprisingly, “monetary barriers” were commonly cited as a reason for debate teams not attending. Some posts expressed support for the tournament and encouraged others to attend but acknowledged that funding for tournament travel was tight. “I really encourage squads to go if they can,” one supporter wrote. “I know there are financial constraints for some teams, but I think that this is a great opportunity for women in the community. Male directors, please if you can (and I know there are programs that legitimately 134 J. POAPST AND A. HARPER don’t have the budget and respect that), make this a priority." This post foregrounded the most common excuse for not attending the tournament: lack of financial resources. But if debate is going to make progress toward greater inclusiveness, we must be willing to invest in initiatives that promote that goal. When coaches decide how to allocate their travel funds, they need to ask themselves these questions: Are the tournaments we’re choosing to attend inclusive and welcoming of women debaters? Do they encourage the participation and success of women in intercollegiate debate? The tendency toward slacktivism on the issue of women’s participation in debate was also evident in one last finding from our analysis of social media posts about the Celebration of Women in Debate Tournament: calls for volunteer judges met with almost no response. Prior to the tournament, Poapst issued three such calls. Compared to the rest of the posts, these received fewer likes, and in the end nobody responded by volunteering to judge, even for pay. Similarly, when individuals were privately contacted with a request to judge, the most common response was, “I would love to, but we already have plans.” Many of these individuals had expressed support for the tournament by “liking” other posts. When it came to backing up that symbolic support with action, however, they declined. Again, if we hope to make progress toward gender equality, the debate community needs to step up, committing not only more financial resources but also their time and talents to the cause. Conclusion Debate in its purest form could be defined as the testing of ideas for making the world better. One idea that already has been tested and generally agreed upon by virtually everybody in the debate community is that debate itself needs to become more inclusive and welcoming for women. Yet the college policy debate community has thus far failed to act on that idea. While most are willing to voice support for initiatives to make women feel more welcome in debate, they too often fail to follow through on that verbal support. If the policy debate community is to reach its professed goal of inclusion and diversity, the community needs to more actively support initiatives designed to promote progressive change. Reflecting on one such initiative through the lens of co-cultural and muted group theory, this essay has shown that while many in the policy debate community voice support for initiatives to encourage and celebrate the participation of women in debate, too many fail to back up that support with concrete action. The Celebration of Women in Debate Tournament at George Mason University in 2014 gave the debate community the opportunity to acknowledge and do something about the problem of gender inequities in policy debate. Many in the community voiced support for the idea. Yet few followed through by committing their time and monetary resources to the event. Change comes at a price, and the debate community must be willing to invest in making policy debate more welcoming and inclusive for women.

#### Social, cultural and affective relationships need to be the starting point to any form of meaningful education

Renold and Ringrose ‘16, \*Professor of Childhood Studies at the School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Wales; \*\* Professor of Sociology of Gender and Education at the UCL, Institute of Education; (Emma and Jessica, “Teen feminist killjoys?: Mapping girls' affective encounters with femininity, sexuality, and feminism at school,” Teen Feminist Killjoys, Chapter 6)

We wish to conclude by suggesting that feminist pedagogical processes in contemporary schools (for instance starting up girl power groups) must start from the social, cultural, and affective complexities of girls’ own experiences of growing up girl, which in this case involved acknowledging the dilemmas of teen feminine sexuality (Tolman 2002, 2013). Engaging with feminism can be at the same time a radically pleasurable and painful set of experiences and processes of identification, contestation, and potential transformation. Ahmed suggests that part of working with the idea of the feminist killjoy is an acknowledgement that “we might need to attend to bad feelings not in order to overcome them but to learn by how we are affected by what comes near, which means achieving a different relationship to all our wanted and unwanted feelings as an ethical resource” (2010: 216). This means we need to engage with feminisms that are inclusive of and work with the complexities and affective ambivalence of teen feminine sexuality— that explore sexuality as often simultaneously pleasure and danger, judgmental and non-judgmental (Tolman 2013). By confronting what girls are actually faced with (such as the painful contradictions around wanting to be both a slutty and a non-slutty girl), we open up space for a more critical, inventive, and ethical feminist pedagogy capable of engaging with the complex material realities of different girls in their various specific embedded and embodied locations and relations.

### Women in Debate

#### Debate structurally favors men—a lack of female role models, coaches, and attention directed toward women in debate discourages female participation and attrition

Raider and Griffin 89’

J. Cinder Griffin and Holly Jane Raider. “Women in High School Debate”. *Punishment Paradigms : Pros and Cons 1989*. [http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Griffin&Raider1989PunishmentPar.htm //](http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Griffin&Raider1989PunishmentPar.htm%20//) PZ

'I don't usually vote for girl debaters because debate really is a boy's activity. I am surprised by your ability to handle these issues.' This is virtually a verbatim quote received by one of the authors on a ballot during her senior year in high school. A woman wrote the ballot. In recent years there has been some effort to isolate the factors that limit the participation of women in collegiate debate.2 These studies are superfluous if the factors regarding participation of females at the high school level are not understood. Unfortunately, no such formal research attempt has been made to explain the reasons underlying the thoughts that contribute to the opening quote. The issue of participation of other minority groups in debate is a topic beyond the scope of our discussion. The virtual non-existence of minorities is a deeply disturbing issue and deserves further investigation. Understanding gender and minority selection of debate as an activity in high school level is useful in explaining those selection factors at the collegiate level. One finds few college debaters who were not exposed to the activity in high school. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a female who has not experienced some competition and success in the activity while in high school will remain, very much less begin, debating in college. Additionally, given its competitive nature, quest for excellence, and skewed gender composition, debate offers a micro-model of the business and academic worlds. There are implications for female representation and treatment in these societal roles as debaters tend to become leaders in both the business and academic worlds. As the perceptions of women ingrained through debate experience are translated into society at large through leadership positions, the implications for under-representation of women in debate takes on greater significance. This article addresses several of the reasons behind female participation rates at the high school level and offers a few solutions to the problem. All things being equal, one would assume roughly equal numbers of male and female participants in high school debate. Debate, unlike athletics, does not require physical skills which might restrict the participation of women. Additionally, debate is academically oriented and women tend to select extracurricular activities , that are more academic in nature than men.3 Based on these assumptions, one would expect proportional representation of the genders in the activity. Why then, are there four times more men in debate than women? Several explanations exist that begin to account for the low rate of female participation in debate. Fewer females enter the activity at the outset. Although organizational and procedural tactics used in high school debate may account for low initial rates of participation, a variety of social and structural phenomena, not necessarily caused by the debate community also account for these rates. Ultimately, the disproportionate attrition rate of female debaters results in the male dominated composition of the activity. There are more disincentives for women to participate in debate than for men. While entry rates for women and man may in some cases be roughly equal, the total number of women who participate for four years is significantly lower than the corresponding number of men. This rate of attrition is due to factors that can be explained largely by an examination of the debate community itself. Socially inculcated values contribute to low rates of female entry in high school debate. Gender bias and its relation to debate has been studied by Manchester and Freidly. They conclude, "[m]ales are adhering to sex-role stereotypes and sex-role expectations when they participate in debate because it is perceived as a masculine' activity. Female debate participants experience more gender-related barriers because they are not adhering to sex-role stereotypes and sex-role expectations.5 In short, 'nice girls' do not compete against or with men, are not assertive, and are not expected to engage in policy discourse, particularly relating to military issues. Rather, "nice girls" should be cheerleaders, join foreign language clubs, or perhaps participate in student government. It should be noted that many of these attitudes are indoctrinated at birth and cannot be directly attributed to the debate community. However, there are many activity specific elements that discourage female participation in high school debate. Structural barriers endemic to the forensics community dissuade female ninth graders from entering the activity.6 Recruitment procedures and initial exposure may unintentionally create a first impression of the activity as dominated by men. By and large, it is a male debater or a male debate coach that will discuss the activity with new students for the first time. Additionally, most debate coaches are men. This reinforces a socially proven norm to prospective debaters, that debate is an activity controlled by men. This male exposure contributes to a second barrier to participation. Parents are more likely to let a son go on an overnight than they are a daughter, particularly when the coach is male and the squad is mostly male. This may be a concern even when the coach is a trusted member of the community. While entry barriers are formidable, female attrition rates effect the number of women in the activity most significantly. Rates of attrition are largely related to the level of success. Given the time and money commitment involved in debate, if one is not winning one quits debating. The problem is isolating the factors that contribute to the early failure of women debaters. Even if equal numbers of males and females enter at the novice level, the female perception of debate as a whole is not based on the gender proportions of her immediate peer group. Rather, she looks to the composition of debaters across divisions. This may be easily understood if one considers the traditional structures of novice debate. Often it is the varsity debate team, composed mostly of males, who coach and judge novice. Novices also learn how to debate by watching debates. Thus, the role models will be those individuals already involved in the activity and entrenched in its values. The importance of female role models and mentors should not be underestimated. There is a proven correlation between the number of female participants and the number of female coaches and judges.8 The presence of female mentors and role models may not only help attract women to the activity, but will significantly temper the attrition rate of female debaters. Novice, female debaters have few role models and, consequently, are more likely to drop out than their male counterparts; resulting in an unending cycle of female attrition in high school debate. Pragmatically, there are certain cost benefit criteria that coaches on the high school level, given the constraints of a budget, must consider. Coaches with teams dominated by males may be reluctant to recruit females due to traveling and housing considerations. Thus, even if a female decides to join the team, her travel opportunities may be more limited than those of the males on the team. Once a female has "proven" herself, the willingness to expend team resources on her increases, assuming she overcomes the initial obstacles.

#### The trend doesn’t improve after highschool—female participation at the NDT and CEDA have never had female participation above 40%. Not addressing sexism now means a continued cycle of gender inequality in the debate community

Matz and Bruschke ‘2006, Associate Dean, College of Communications at California State University, Fullerton; Professor in the Human Communication Studies department at California State University Fullerton, (S. Irene and John, “Gender Inequity in Debate, Legal and Business Professions”) http://commfaculty.fullerton.edu/imatz/Research\_Articles/Gender\_Inequity/Gender\_inequity\_in\_debate.htm

The best-studied events are the national championship tournaments, both the Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA) national tournament and the National Debate Tournament (NDT). Participation patterns of each demonstrate gender exclusion in slightly different ways. Considering the NDT first, the earliest studies reported that roughly 14% to 15% of debaters participating at the NDT in the mid-1980s were female (Friedley & Manchester, 1985; Logue, 1993; Skarb, 2003, p. 45). Southworth’s (2003) complete listing of female participation shows that between 1947-2002 overall female participation has been 14.2% and never higher than 24%. Although since 1995 there has been a slight tendency toward increased participation, females only comprise roughly one-fifth of all NDT competitors (see Table 1). The CEDA national tournament has a slightly different pattern. Demographics have been tracked by Stepp and Gardner (2001) who conducted a ten-year study collecting demographic data from competitors attending the national championship between 1991-2001. From 1991 to 1997, female participation rates increased but since that time there has been a steady decline. At no point have females ever constituted more than 41% of the preliminary round competitors. Comparatively, the CEDA national tournament has more overall female participation but shows no evidence of growth in gender diversity, and the NDT shows a trend toward increased diversity but much lower female participation overall. At neither tournament have females ever constituted more than roughly 40% of the overall participant pool. The pattern of female participation at these tournaments is not encouraging inasmuch as progress towards improving gender diversity. In viewing other tournaments for comparison, Rogers (1997) tracked 17 Great Salt Lake (GSL) tournaments in 1992 and found that 43% of the competitors were females or minorities. It might appear that females are gaining in participation, but because this research was not longitudinal, it is unknown whether this higher representation was consistent at subsequent GSL tournaments. The participation rates reflect a higher percent at the novice level (55%) with only 40% at the junior varsity and 22% at the open levels supporting results from other tournaments that females are not equally represented at the elimination rounds. Skarb (2003) conducted the first and only extant study to examine all debaters who competed in at least one tournament in his study of the 2002-2003 college debate season. Of the 1552 participants, 39% were females. Their participation at regional debate tournaments was 40.8%, while they comprised 30.3% of attendees at national tournaments (p. 45). There were stark differences across divisions of competition; for example, only 28.8% of participants at the open national tournaments were females, while the figure was 52.8% at novice regional tournaments (p. 45). In general, these studies show that females are underrepresented in debate and that there is no notable trend toward increased equity. Although it is not the focus of this study, it is worth noting that gender inequity is even more pronounced among the judge and director population, and that trend is getting markedly worse (Stepp & Gardner, 2001). Females are even more underrepresented in terms of success. In Stepp and Gardner’s (2001) ten-year study, on an average, females made up 35.9% of participants but only 26.2% of students advancing to the elimination rounds were female. Rogers (1997) found that women had proportional success in novice and junior varsity divisions but not in open divisions. Skarb (2003) found that all-female teams lost to all-male teams 53.9% of the time overall, and the trend was more pronounced in the open divisions especially in the elimination rounds in open divisions. In tier 1, all-female teams actually beat all-male teams more often in the novice divisions. Whereas in open division, they lost 62.7% of their elimination debates to all-male teams and 63.5% of their debates to mixed-sex teams. Skarb also found that male speakers averaged roughly half a speaker point a round more than female speakers. This finding is very consistent with that of Bruschke & Johnson (1994) who studied 1,720 speaker points given at tournaments spanning the 1988 through 1992 seasons. Finally, Southworth’s (2003) comprehensive history of the NDT shows that between 1947-2002 females comprised 14.2% of participants overall but only 9.8% of elimination round participants and 6.7% of speaker award recipients.

### Education First

#### Understanding and reorienting education to be less patriarchal is key to creating ethical policy solutions

Martin ’85, Professor Emerita of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Boston, (Jane R. “Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman,” *Yale University Press*, Neglected Conversations, pp. 4-6. // PZ

Although these theorists of female education were well known in their own day, it is likely that until recently even Wollstonecraft's name would have been unfamiliar to historians of educational thought. I am able to cite them here because contemporary research on women is in the process of recovering the lives and works of so many who had been lost to history. Yet even if blame does not attach to the authors of the texts that silence women's voices, the fate of the contributions of Plato and Rousseau suggests that had the writings on female education of Macauley, Wollstonecraft, Beecher, and Gilman been known to exist, they too would have been ignored. The devaluation of women is not the only unhappy consequence of the exclusion from the history of educational thought of all conversation about female education. The noted philosopher of education Israel Scheffler has said that the function of philosophy is to enlighten policy "by pressing its traditional questions of value, virtue, veracity, and validity." 7 These questions need to be pressed in relation to policies concerning the education of girls and women; yet as long as the conversation to which they belong is considered to fall outside the province of philosophy, they cannot be. In inviting students to take responsibility for their own education, Rich beseeched them to reject those models of feminine weakness, selfdenial, and subservience the culture holds up to them: Responsibility to yourself means that you don't fall for shallow and easy solutions-predigested books and ideas, weekend encounters guaranteed to change your life, taking 'gut' courses instead of ones you know will challenge you, bluffing at school and life instead of doing solid work, marrying early as an escape from real decisions, getting pregnant as an evasion of already existing problems. It means that you refuse to sell your talents and aspirations short, simply to avoid conflict and confrontation. And this, in turn, means resisting forces in society which say that women should be nice, play safe, have low professional expectations, drown in love and forget about work, live through others, and stay in the places assigned to us. 8 This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Sat, 24 Jun 2017 15:16:28 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Neglected Conversation I 5 Every woman has felt the pull of one or more of these negative models. She who is not attracted to the ideal of the self-denying wife and mother may become a woman who denies her intelligence; she who disdains the ideal of silent passivity may find the model of "the slapdash dilettante who never commits herself to anything the whole way" irresistible. Each of us will see mother or daughter, sister or friend, if not oneself, represented on Rich's list. Unfortunately, if a woman does what Rich asks-if she takes responsibility for her own education-she will find herself at a disadvantage. How can a woman avoid shallow solutions to the problems education poses if she never hears what has been said by those who have thought deeply on the subject? How can she know what education to claim if she has never entered into philosophical conversation about this education herself, indeed never even realized that such conversation existed?9 Not only women are led astray in this circumstance; men also suffer when they are denied knowledge of the range of educational ideals past philosophers have held up for half the population. In A Vindication Wollstonecraft makes clear the disastrous consequences for the man, Emile, of the faulty education Rousseau designs for Sophie. Sophie's case can be generalized. So long as men and women inhabit the same society and live overlapping lives, each sex will be affected by the education of the other. Unenlightened policies of female education will inevitably redound on males. There is another reason men suffer when past conversation about women's education is ignored. Historians of educational thought are not antiquarians whose sole concern is to preserve the ideas of the past. They justify their inquiries by reference to the insights into contemporary education yielded by a study of past philosophies. "Philosophy, unlike the sciences, never fully outgrows its history," says Scheffler. "The arguments and conceptions of past thinkers retain a fundamental relevance for contemporary philosophy even as it struggles to find new ways for itself."•o Historical study, then, illuminates educational practice today and guides the development, clarification, and testing of new theories about what education should be." How much illumination can be shed on the education of boys and men by a historical narrative that ignores girls and women? Philosophers do not construct theories of education in a vacuum. Viewing education as preparation for carrying on societal roles, they tie their proposals to some vision of the good society. And insofar as the society the philosopher pictures is peopled by both sexes, we cannot evaluate the educational ideal it holds up for males unless we know its expectations for females. We will not even know the right questions to ask. Do men and women in the envisioned society have reciprocal roles, with men carrying out the functions of citizenship and women those of domesticity? If so, we must ask not only if the education claimed for males will equip them to be good citizens but also if it will promote or frustrate the efforts of women to perform their own functions effectively. Alternatively, do men and women in this society share roles and the tasks and functions associated with them? If so, we must ask if the full complement of significant social roles is reflected in the education claimed for both men and women.

### Political engagement impossible

#### Women are largely unable to access political insitutions because they remain gendered in ways that value traditionally performed masculinity. “Inclusion” means conformation

Shames ’15, Assistant Professor at Rutgers University-Camden, (Shauna, “Barriers and Solutions to Increasing Women’s Political Power,”) [https://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/shauna\_shames\_-\_barriers\_and\_solutions.pdf //](https://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/shauna_shames_-_barriers_and_solutions.pdf%20//) PZ

Persisting Gender Roles: Certain features of gender have proven resistant to feminist critique over the past few decades, including the association of masculinity with leadership and femininity with weakness. Although recent discussion of “transformational leadership” has begun to help us appreciate the advantages of nontraditional approaches, implicit biases (especially activated in a context of crisis) lead to suspicion that women are not “strong enough” to be political leaders. A lack of women in high-powered positions may affect both men’s and women’s perceptions of women’s “ability to rule.”16 And while we know that mentorship is the most powerful way to bring more women into political office (and counteract social biases), being a token “woman at the top” is often accompanied by extreme work-overload that leaves little time for female political leaders to be nurturing the next generation of women in politics. Family Work and Time Constraints: Continuing uneven distribution of family care responsibilities means that women spend far more time than men in home- and child-care. Studies repeatedly demonstrate that women pay a “motherhood penalty,” across fields, relating not just to the time, effort, and medical care of pregnancy and childbirth, but to the far greater maternal involvement necessary for breastfeeding, and to the persistent tendency of women to do a larger share of childcare as the child grows. Anyone deeply involved in childcare, whether male or female, would face tough time constraints navigating between family responsibilities and a political position; because the work is rarely equally shared, women are more disadvantaged. Generally, the result – Discussion Draft – 4 (“consistent around the globe”) is that, compared to men, “female politicians tend to start their careers later, have fewer children, spend more time caring for their families, and arrange their lives to have shorter commuting time than their male counterparts.”18 (Indeed, commute time to a state’s capital correlates strongly with the number of women who run for that state’s legislature.19) This means that “[O]nly women with supportive families run for office, whereas men are more likely to run in spite of discouragement from their families.”20 Spotlight on minority women: Work-family conflict may be exacerbated for various groups of women. In speaking to Latinas across the U.S., Political Parity found the impact of gender roles to be stronger for Hispanic than white women.21 Traditional gender-role ideology also proved more complicated for the candidacies of Republican women, as compared to Democrats.22 Structurally, single women find it difficult if not impossible to run, for reasons both financial and time-related, which disproportionately rules out far too many black women. And while there are not enough examples to study much yet, we have yet to find out whether openly-lesbian women will continue to face the kind of gender-role discrimination that has limited their political careers in the past. Risk-taking and Rushing In: New political “spaces” frequently open up through revolutions (be they political or technological) or the creation of new groups or movements. It is common for men to rush in to fill these new spaces. Sometimes the exclusion of women has been explicit and intentional, as in the classic case of the French Revolution23 -- but often it is an unintended consequence of men’s greater tendency to seize the moment without needing to consider gendered effects of their actions and women’s to hesitate, perhaps rationally, knowing the punishment for them will be harsher should they fail). When deliberate exclusion gives rise to awareness and anger on the part of women 24, it can launch feminist movements, as with suffrage and women’s liberation. Recently created spaces, such as those created by the Silicon Valley rush and the emerging political blogosphere25, provide an interesting example, seeming to enrich and empower men without a corresponding feminism being awakened on the part of women (and mostly without conscious effort on the part of men to be gender-inclusive).26 PSYCHOLOGICAL/MOTIVATIONAL BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S POLITICAL POWER Political Culture: Political discourse and electoral campaigns have grown extremely negative, acrimonious, and, all too often, uncivil. While acrimony and incivility seem to turn off most citizens27, and turn away good potential candidates of all genders and colors, it seems to affect women more than men28, and women of color most of all.29 Generally the effect of increased partisanship and negativity has been the exit of crucial moderate legislators – like Connie Morella in the House and Senator Olympia Snowe, Republican women who made possible bipartisan progress on gendered policy issues – and the increased entry of hardline ideologues (both male and female). Finally, it appears that the increasing intrusion into the private lives of candidates (as well as their families and friends) may deter women more than men – but also seems to deter good potential candidates, no matter their gender.30 Not Believing Politics Matters: Like men, **women are often ambitious to change the world, but are far less likely to believe that politics is the most effective or efficient means of doing this.** In a recent survey of graduate students in law or policy schools, men were significantly more likely to agree that “The problems that I most care about can be solved through politics.”31 Given the many costs, financial and personal, involved in mounting a political campaign (costs which are higher for women – Discussion Draft – 5 than for men), and the scant rewards of holding office, it is no surprise that women are far less likely to want to run. Additionally, as institutionalist scholars point out**, we continue to exclude women from politics by maintaining gendered political institutions** that value men and masculinity and devalue women and femininity. “Inclusion” thus has to mean more than bringing in women and expecting them to conform to male norms within institutions; our ideals of candidates and officeholders need to be “re-gendered” to give women greater incentive to engage.32 Spotlight on minority women: Women of color, especially black and Hispanic women, were the least likely to think that politics could lead to positive change.33 Republican women may also be limited by the conscious and unconscious associations of their party with masculinity34 and/or with their party’s extreme rightward tilt in past elections (including the threat to “primary” those who are not extreme conservative ideologues, which may lead moderate Republican women to simply not run).

## Alternative

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of adopting a feminist pedagogy—we must embrace discomfort in order to critique the curriculum and educational spaces we engage. Feminist pedagogy is key to thinking critically about the traditional canon of patriarchal education.

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Professor of Education Kathleen Weiler states: “I would like to suggest that feminist pedagogy, like feminism itself, is ultimately a political project” (67). Most feminist professors writing about feminist pedagogy have a similar appreciation for the intrinsically political nature of feminist pedagogy. Weiler describes the role feminist pedagogy plays in the field of education: In terms of education, feminists have been influential in challenging the structure of the traditional canon and in suggesting alternative classroom practices; both of these interventions have been included in the broad term feminist pedagogy. . . . What distinguishes feminist pedagogy from these other approaches, of course, is its analysis of patriarchy and attempts to develop an education appropriate for women. (68) As this description shows, feminist pedagogy is not only teaching about feminism; it simultaneously mandates a feminist critique of the educational process, as well as implementation of anti-hierarchal techniques in the classroom. This practice helps to reeducate students holistically, enabling them to become empowered, active learners and assisting them with using their educational experience as a means of social justice. This empowerment however, must overcome a “hidden curriculum” lurking within the university system (Boyer and Larson, 168-169). According to psychologists Boyer and Larson, this “hidden curriculum” is composed of rules for advancement and success, messages regarding who belongs in the university and who is outside it and, “institutionalized monocultural androcentrism” which demands cultural transformation of anyone from “outside” the university—all forcing minorities (including women) to abandon their cultural uniqueness in exchange for academic success (168-169). In order to overcome these problems, feminist pedagogy strives to create a space and a method for its students to unlearn these rules and arm themselves with theory that supports their self-rediscovery, so that they can better cope in more traditional university courses. Professor of English Magda Gere Lewis explains: Women often come away from the experience of the feminist classroom not only with new understandings both of history and of possible futures—the wish for a feminist utopia embedded in practice rather than the death wish for a perfect world—but, as well, prepared to articulate practical strategies for critique which challenge the androcentric biases of their other courses. This does not always gain them favor. Their experiences reflect how difficult this is to do in the face of resistance and the determined power of the status quo to hold firm its privilege to articulate our collective meaning. (67) According to professor of women’s studies Jean Fox O’Barr, preparation for a lifestyle of resistance to the mainstream is needed by women’s studies graduate students, in particular, given that their academic department is not only their “social” but their “professional” world as well (117). Women’s studies graduate students often choose to merge their extracurricular social justice work with their professional work, making their professions a site of cultural resistance. As a result, this double identification with their department ensures that women’s studies graduate students “experience the issue of isolation more intensely” (O’Barr, 117). For many, the women’s studies method is something to be feared: 38 Graduate students often find explorations into the history of feminist scholarship both critical and frightening. They know that without this material they cannot get the full benefit of their disciplinary journeys. Yet gaining a feminist perspective makes them angry, frustrated, and sometimes discouraged with how much remains to be done. . . . Graduate students face another reality: that learning this new material requires them to unlearn some of their collegiate knowledge they have mastered and to which they cling when so many previous foundations are being shaken. (O’Barr, 117-118) Conversely, if students are willing to enter into an uncomfortable critique, unlearn cherished knowledge and be filled with anger and frustration, the payoffs can be as intense as the difficult process of feminist exploration. In Teaching to Transgress The feminist classroom was the one space where students could raise critical questions about the pedagogical process. These critiques were not always encouraged or well received, but they were allowed. That small acceptance of critical interrogation was a crucial challenge inviting us as students to think seriously about pedagogy in relation to the practice of freedom. (6) , English and women’s studies professor bell hooks describes this transformation: For bell hooks, being free begins with learning how to think critically: “In our society, which is so fundamentally anti-intellectual, critical thinking is not encouraged. . . . Conditions of radical openness exist in any learning situation where students and teachers celebrate their abilities to think critically, to engage in pedagogical praxis” (Teaching to Transgress, 202). Many feminist scholars insist that teaching students to think critically must serve as the foundation to feminist pedagogy. Professors of English Amy Spanger Gerald, Kathleen McEvoy and Pamela Whitfield write: “Critical thinking, as manifested in the ability to resist accepted truths about literature, traditional modes of writing, and stereotypical ideas about speaking, is a feminist approach because it fights limiting and inherently patriarchal educational practices” (48). Feminist teachers want students to learn how to be comfortable being uncomfortable and want to provide them with experience and skills (partially through the use of alternative classroom techniques) to deal with this lifestyle of constant confrontation.

#### Feminist pedagogy is an engagement with learning through critique of processes which reinforce domination

hooks ’65, social activist, feminist theorist, educator, writer (youre a square if you don’t know who bell hooks is), (bell, “Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black,” South End Press, Chapter 8, pp. 49-50) // PZ

4. At this historical moment, there is a crisis of engagement within universities, for when knowledge becomes commoditized, then much authentic learning ceases. Students who want to learn hunger for a space where they can be challenged intellectually. Students also suffer, as many of us who teach do, from a crisis of meaning, unsure about what has value in life, unsure even about whether it is important to stay alive. They long for a context where their subjective needs can be integrated with study, where the primary focus is a broader spectrum of ideas and modes of inquiry, in short a dialectical context where there is serious and rigorous critical exchange. This is an important and exciting time for feminist pedagogy because in theory and practice our work meets these needs. 5. Feminist education-the feminist classroom is and should be a place where there is a sense of struggle. Where there is visible acknowledgment of the union of theory and practice, where we work together as teachers and students to overcome the estrangement and alienation that have become so much the norm in the contemporary university. Most importantly, feminist pedagogy should engage students in a learning process that makes the world "more rather than less real.” It my classrooms, we work to dispel the notion that our experience is not a “real world" experience. This is especially easy since gender is such a pressing issue in contemporary life. Every aspect of popular culture alerts us to the reality that folks are thinking about gender in both reactionary and progressive ways. What is important is that they are thinking critically. And it is this space that allows for the possibility of feminist intervention, whether it be in our classroom or in the life of students outside the classroom. Lately, there has been a truly diverse body of students coming to my classes and other feminist classes at universities all around the United States. Freire writes, “Education as the practice of freedom-as opposed to education as the practice of domination-denies that we are abstract, isolated. independent, and unattached to the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from us.“ 6. To make a revolutionary feminist pedagogy, we must relinquish our ties to traditional ways of teaching that reinforce domination. To have a revolutionary feminist pedagogy we must first focus on the teacher-student relationship and the issue of power. How do we as feminist teachers use power in a way that is not coercive, dominating? Many women have had difficulty asserting power in the feminist classroom for fear that to do so would be to exercise domination. Yet we must acknowledge that our role as teacher is a position of power over others. We can use that power in ways that diminish or in ways that enrich and it is this choice that should distinguish feminist pedagogy from ways of teaching that reinforce domination. One simple way to alter the way one's “power” as teacher is experienced in the classroom is to elect not to assume the posture of all-knowing professors. This is also difficult. When we acknowledge that we do not know everything, that we do not have all the answers, we risk students leaving our classrooms and telling others that we are not prepared. It is important to make it clear to students that we are prepared and that the willingness to be open and honest about what we do not know is a gesture of respect for them.

## AT:

### Perm

#### The alternative is rejection and we have not given the affirmative the right to turn this no into yes—the act of saying no is political labour that can not be diluted through the affs attempt to sever their own sexist actions and representations

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For feminism: no is political labour. No means no. A no becomes blunt to make a point. It might seem that no means no is an unnecessary speech act; truth as virtue; something as true by virtue of the meaning of the word. We learn that the meaning of no can be erased by history; no can be stripped of life and vitality; no can even be turned and twisted into its opposite; no as yes. We have to say no means no because no has not been heard as no, because even when women said no they have been heard as saying yes. There is a patriarchal history: how men are given permission to hear no as yes, to assume women are willing, whatever women say, despite what they say, a history that is central to the injustice of the law, which has historically read consent off women’s own bodies or conduct, as if by dressing this way, or by doing something that way, she is enacting yes, even when she herself says no. We need to hear the violence that converts no into yes. We might also need to hear the cases in which yes involves force but is not experienced as force, when for instance she says yes to something as the consequences of saying no would be too much (loss of access to children, to resources or benefits, to a place of residence). You might not say no because you have been warned about the consequences of saying no. A warning is so often a threat: if you say no, then. If you cannot do then, you cannot say no. If your position is precarious you might not be able to afford no. You might say yes if you cannot afford to say no, which means you can say yes whilst disagreeing with something. This is why the less precarious might have a political obligation to say no on behalf of or alongside those who are more precarious.[2] My project on complaint is teaching me more about how no operates as a form of political expression.[3] I am learning how making a complaint might be the moment a no is formally articulated; and how a complaint comes from a series of no’s, not all of which are articulated or put into words. The culture e of a department is shaped around misogyny. Sexist jokes are used as a form of social bonding; sexist modes of address have become a routine. You enter the room, and sexism fills the room. You are supposed to laugh. You do not laugh. Just by not laughing at a joke you are heard as saying no, as making a statement. You do not have to say anything; not laughing becomes audible as political speech because this “not” registers as a different direction.[4] A no can be expressed in how you do not go along with something; how you do not participate in something. When you do not laugh, you become a negative, you embody that negative. Once you are known as a woman who does not laugh at sexist jokes, who will not laugh at sexist jokes, once you are known as a feminist, violence is channeled in your direction. When was diffused throughout the room was still directed (sexist and racist jokes: the point is the direction), but it is sharpened by being narrowed. Violence is redirected toward those who do not participate in violence, or those who try to challenge violence. Each time you say no, you have to be prepared for an increase in the intensity of the violence. And then: if you make a formal complaint about sexism or sexual harassment, if you transform no into testimony, that violence is amped up even more. A complaint is treated as damaging the reputation of individuals as well as organizations. When you become the cause of damage, they cause you damage. To say no to something can lead to the intensification of something. You have to keep saying no when there is an effort to stop you saying no. This is why we need to assemble a feminist support system to enable us to proceed; saying no requires having places to go. And this is what we mean when we ask for safe spaces: spaces in which the violence we are trying to redress is not directed right back at us. It is because it is not safe for many to say no that we need safe spaces. If each time you say no, you encounter more and more pressure not to say no, then the more you say no, the more you have to say no. You have to say no to what follows saying no. Another way of putting this: the more you complain the more you have to complain about. And this is why when we say no we address a system. A system is reproduced by how those who say no to a system are stopped. Those who complain about a system, those who intervene by saying no at some point, and saying no can sometimes be a matter of not saying yes, of not going along with something, encounter the full force of that system. A system: can be what comes down on you; a ton of bricks. And so: no requires political work; you have to find a way to keep going; you have to find ways of working with others to keep no going. Sometimes I have used willfulness to describe that political work. The effort to acquire a will to disobey is the effort not only to say no but to say it publicly, to say it loudly, or to perform it through one’s own bodily action or inaction. With no, we leap. Make a leap. Right now; we need a many to say no, no to austerity, no to the dismantling of the welfare state, no to the destruction of public services; no to the world that renders some disposable, that makes poverty into crime; death into policy. These no’s might begin as a no to an injustice, a violence that allows a system to reveal itself, political violence, such as the violence of the Grenfell Tower fire, a violence that showed racial capitalism for what it is: a system that renders poor people, many of whom are also brown and black people, vulnerable to death. We might recall here Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s powerful description of racism as “the state-sanctioned or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (2007, 28). Racial capitalism: how many are sentenced to death. To mourn the deaths of those who lost their lives in Grenfell Tower, whose lives were taken, the deaths that have yet to be counted; a failure to count that seems to show who counts more, who counts less, is to commit to no. We say no to this sentencing, we ask for a counting. In the face of the brutality, the horror of this most political of disasters, in the face of the sadness of so many lives taken, so many ordinaries devastated, I have found it hard to find words. And I have been grateful for those who have been able to pick themselves up and articulate no in the midst of shattering. I think of the words sent out by Labour MP David Lammy [5], Aditya Chakrabortty, Youssef El-Gingihy, Divya Ghenila amongst many others. Amplification: we need to become each other’s microphones, raising the sounds of no, a chain of resistance. We need to listen to survivors. No preceded this disaster. It was not an accident that the complaints of the Grenfell Action Group about fire risks to their building (amongst other forms of negligence and neglect affecting the lives and well-being of residents of Lancaster West Estate) were not heard. It is important to recall how their no was rendered inaudible; how they were heard as trouble-makers, as noise; how they were threatened with the law; how complaint is not heard by being heard as defaming, as spoiling the reputation of a company or person. Spoiling: spoiling a landscape, cladding as covering; not counting as covering up; spoil sports, spoiling, sullying; tarnishing an image. Not hearing a complaint about a system is built into the system; a system reproduces itself by how no is not heard as anything other than as yet more evidence of not being deserving (of a hearing, of housing, of safety). Even the bare minimum of care becomes too much to ask for. When you have been made disposable your no is disposed. We say no; no to this disposal of no. We raise our voices in saying no to this violence and injustice. No can become a form of critical refusal, as Angela Davis might suggest; no that involves commitment, no that requires time and work as we grapple to understand the system from which an injustice gapes like a hole; no as part of a project of counter-knowledge, to counter with knowledge; no as a struggle not to reproduce injustices that exist. When we live with what we say no to, we live with no. We hear no. You clamor; no as political speech. We need no now; we need no to become many and momentum.

### Universalism

#### The theory of patriarchy can and should account for varying degrees and experience of violence in order to avoid an essentialist viewpoint

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It is possible to move away from “universalizing theorizing” while still keeping theoretical focus on gender and dominance (Smart, 1989). Although there is a tacit agreement among feminists that male-dominated social order is the key to unlocking understanding of violence against women, the use of the particular term patriarchy has been hotly contested. The major reason that some theorists have dismissed the usefulness of patriarchy is because of its false universalism (Beechey, 1979; Connell, 1990). At some point, the term patriarchy began to imply a fixed and timeless structure that obscured differences in context and reduced all gender relations into one form. Because patriarchy was frequently constructed in static form, it did not permit variation. Its “apparent” universal feature came to eclipse its “true” multiple shapes and forms.5

A cursory glance at the literature would show that there is indeed a multiplicity of connections between variations of patriarchal arrangements and violence against women. For example, wife beating happens more frequently in households where traditional gender roles are strongest (Walker, 1977/1978), suggesting that more extreme patriarchal ideology is connected to domestic violence. Men are not as accountable for victimizing women in societies where gender stratification is most extreme, because authorities are not committed to preventing it, suggesting that women’s violence may take distinct forms in overtly patriarchal states (Blumberg, 1979). There is wild variation in violence against women across social space. Dowry murders exist in Hindu countries but not in the United States (Menon, 2003). Rape is significantly higher in the United States than in Britain (Messerschmidt, 1993). Some historic hunting and gathering tribes have been shown by anthropologists to be rape free (Sanday, 1981). And the spousal ratio of killing varies from 0 in India to 200 in Detroit (Daly & Wilson, 1992), yet every one of these societies can be characterized as patriarchal. A theory of patriarchy and violence against women would need to account for variation across time and space. It would need to be historical, incorporating understanding of how structure and agency, domination and contestation, change and vary. A classification of various empirical configurations shows that violence against women occurs with different forms and frequencies according to “degrees of patriarchy.”

When patriarchy is used simplistically, it obscures the complexity of gender systems, rendering them inevitable and universal. However, if a theory of patriarchy is constructed that theorizes about variation, it has the potential to illuminate different forms of male domination. Nearly two decades after the debate on patriarchy’s false universalism has been taken up in the literature, we have more flexible ways of viewing social arrangements. Postmodernists and poststructuralists have helped us to see society as forever shifting, ambiguous, and fluid (Carrington, 1994). Bauman contends that social order is more of a “flow than a structure” (Daems & Robert, 2007). Patriarchal structures, order, customs, and power are “melting,” continually taking new shapes (Bauman, 2000). Thinking about patriarchal systems as “varieties in movement” steers us clear of essentialist, rigid, and solid ways of thinking about social structures.

In addition to the contributions of postmodernists, feminist historians have helped to steer feminist thought clear of monolithic constructions by documenting historical and cultural variation in patriarchies. By investigating how changing historical situations result in shifts in constructions of gender, feminist historians have revealed the instability of patriarchy over time, as well how these systems are continually reconstructed by social change (Ryan, Walkowitz, & Newton, 1983).

### War Root Cause

#### The pursuit of hegemony is not neutral – gender violence not only results from hegemonic projects, but is constitutive of them

Nayak & Suchland 6

(Meghana, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science at NYC, Jennifer, Ph.D. in Political Science and Government from The University of Texas at Austin, Volume 8, 2006 - Issue 4: Gender Violence and Hegemonic Projects, “Gender Violence And Hegemonic Projects,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616740600945024?scroll=top&needAccess=true>, Accessed: 7.11.17)VW

For example, current hegemonic practices of neoliberalism and neocolonialism circumscribe what democracy and rights are supposed to look like in terms of their appropriate forms and definitions, the legitimate actions taken in the name of democracy and rights as well as the parameters of justice and political participation. In this way, hegemonic actors (political elites and privileged activists for example) deflect criticism by feigning neutrality or ubiquity and, as we argue, require and shape discourses and practices of gender violence. While there may be identifiable actors, this does not mean that domination is suffi- ciently challenged by ‘cutting off the oppressor’s head’ because of how domination is imbricated in interpersonal, local, global, cultural, economic and social dynamics. As noted above, gender violence accomplishes certain things and fixes particular meanings and practices. Given that hegemonic projects also attempt to create a particular world of meaning and being, both gender violence and hegemonic projects can help each other ‘succeed’. Although it is not only the epistemic that generates hegemonic projects, we pay particular attention in this Special Issue to the hegemonic projects of ‘the state’. We do not conceive of the state as an actor but rather as an idea or what Pierre Bourdieu (1994) calls a ‘bureaucratic field’ that wields symbolic power and centralizes power. It is possible that the principal hegemonic project of the modern world is the project of ‘the state’. Our predominant focus on the state as a hegemonic project, then, is not to affirm state-centrism but to acknowledge that the state is still a central organizing political category of our lives. The politics of opposition, categories of identity and contemporary forms of domination work through the state in many ways. Our focus is on hegemonic projects – such as economic development (and its proxy neoliberalism), women’s rights activism, nation-building and national security – that are implicitly executed in the name of ‘the state’. These issues of gender, violence and power have been dealt with to some extent in feminist IR scholarship on the issues of gender, violence and power. Whereas traditional IR theory often views power as an ability to leverage material resources to get others to do what is not in their interests, feminists have exposed the gendered context of power thereby revealing more nuanced dimensions of hegemonic projects such as nationalism, militarism and globalization. The militarization of daily life when states promote military apparatuses as the solution for stability, security and development, the use of rape as a tool of war and the disproportionate effects of violence on particular women are three examples of a gendered conception of power (Enloe 2000; Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank 2000; Giles and Hyndman 2004). Feminist understandings of power have also exposed how gender is used to legitimize the operations of hegemonic projects. One example is the use of gendered conceptions of ‘protecting family and nation’ to promote military operations; another is the gender hierarchy that grounds, enables or cements the separation of public and private spheres (Peterson and Runyan 1998). While the issue of gender violence is indeed more prominent now because of the growth of feminist IR theory, we want to push for a further examination of the constitutive role gender violence plays in hegemonic projects. The scholarship on gender violence in IR certainly shows how hegemonic projects, such as nationalism or war, are deeply gendered and thus result in violence against women. But, while this vantage point is critical and often gets at the construction of gender, this framework generally only sees gender violence as primarily an example of hegemonic projects – one effect of power through the register of gender, rather than as contested, productive and coterminous with power. If we, as feminist theorists, respond to the obsessive focus on war in the mainstream IR field by documenting power relationships in terms of ‘Man’ over ‘Woman’/State over Citizen, we may inadvertently reaffirm understandings of violence as a ‘tool’ for particular goals of power. We acknowledge that power itself is an understudied political concept, particularly regarding the multiple and layered forms that it takes. It would be easy to set up the realist, masculinist conceptualization of power as a ‘strawperson’ against which to posit the importance of feminist scholarship. However, we are pushing for feminist intervention in various discussions of power, whether it takes the form of compulsory control over others, indirect control via institutions and rules, structural ‘constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation’, particularly in terms of ‘producing social positions of capital and labor’, or ‘the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 3– 4). Therefore, building on the work of feminist challenges to traditional IR views on power and of feminist scholarship on the gendered effects and production of various forms of power, we seek more nuanced understandings on this topic through the examination of the relationship between hegemony, gender and violence. It is often the case that the very contours of what constitutes gender violence in feminist IR scholarship are drawn by the issue of ‘violence against women’. Keck and Sikkink (1998) rightly explain how a transnational advocacy network actively developed the ‘violence against women’ frame, coalescing several campaigns worldwide into a platform that gets at the politics of pain which disproportionately targets women. The approach has raised awareness, galvanized support, given rise to much professional and political activity and enabled women’s groups to secure funding. But these political goals may have been secured at a certain cost. In the first place, the ‘violence against women’ approach relies on representational understandings of gender violence. In other words, the focus on violence against women also potentially ignores violence against men and against groups in ways that are gendered, raced and internationalized. For example, feminist IR scholars invoke the presumably disproportionate targeting of women during conflict in ways that emphasize particular gendered effects of conflict and the masculinized state; the general effect is the lack of due attention to what it means to ‘make’ gender through violence or to the way codes of masculinity negatively affect men. Second, we also note that responses to gender violence, in many ways more so than any other political category, have sanctified racism, imperialism and Orientalism among feminists and critical theorists. For example, the obsession with ‘Islamism’ as the explanation par excellence for gender troubles around the world as well as the romanticization and infantilization of indigenous and/or marginalized women, belie feminist concerns about hierarchy (Nayak 2006; Shepherd 2006). Feminists participate in these problematic discussions about gender violence when we presume that the only reason a woman may die elsewhere is because of her (monolithically) oppressive culture in contrast to the choices and freedom of women in the West. Ironically, it may be such limited understandings of gender violence that unintentionally keep the topic of gender on the sidelines of political science. If gender violence is just an effect of power and does not substantively contribute to how we understand the operations of power, then the issues that gender violence raises may be dismissed as ‘women’s issues’ rather than instrumental to knowledge in political science. This dynamic also increases the ghettoization of feminist IR scholarship and scholars (cf. Weber 1994).1 The current lacuna in IR scholarship on hegemony as well as on gender violence is not accidental but rather signals the production of knowledge in this field. Work on gender violence is not predominant in political science or the IR field precisely because it is conceived as ‘just’ violence against women. In other words, in order to further our understandings of violence, we must interrogate gender violence as constitutive of power, and to understand power, we must go beyond current understandings that see ‘it’ in terms of tools or phenomena that act on gender. And, as we do so, we simultaneously ask why the questions we examine in this Special Issue are left on the margins of scholarship. Thus, we come to the following: why does our argument that gender violence is more than a case study of the effects of hegemony and, rather, is constitutive of hegemonic projects, matter? By re-orienting the relationship between gender violence and hegemonic projects we challenge the ‘naturalness’ of the category of gender violence and assert it as constitutive of the productive forces of hegemonic projects. This framework provides a fresh and critical approach to understanding hegemonic projects and the construction of difference(s). We reference the work of postcolonial and critical race feminists who explain how neocolonial and neoimperial state formations are productive of and reliant upon gendered and racialized conceptualizations of citizens, immigrants and of ‘us/them’ dichotomies (McClintock 1995; Chatterjee and Jeganathan 2000; Stoler 2002). Postcolonial theory also explains how a fixation on violence ‘over there’ sidesteps how power works via international hierarchy (Chowdhry and Nair 2002). Similarly, we also believe that gender violence, rather than simply a result of war or culture, is vital and pivotal to the possibility of political violence and hegemony in the first place. Recent critical feminist engagements with international political economy (IPE) have also shown how the exploitation of women, and particularly women of color, is not simply an unintended consequence of global capitalism. Rather, the advancement of global capitalism under the dominant ideological rationale of neoliberalism depends on women’s secondary gendered status and global class hierarchy (Mies 1998; Peterson 2003; Agathangelou 2004). Drawing on these important literatures, we seek with this Special Issue to push the connections between gender violence and hegemonic projects beyond the ‘effects of power’ view towards an understanding that places the constitutive function of gender violence at the forefront.

### Definition of Gender

#### Social factors code gendered acts, making gender performative and not stable. Our feminist critique is an attempt to break down power relations that shape a normative definition of woman and directs violence towards bodies that don’t “correctly” perform gender

Mikkola ’17, Junior Professor in Practical Philosophy at the Humboldt-University, Berlin, (Mari, “Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, summer 2017 edition) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/feminism-gender/> // PZ

Further, being feminine and desiring men (for instance) are standardly assumed to be expressions of one's gender as a woman. Butler denies this and holds that gender is really performative. It is not “a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is … instituted … through a stylized repetition of [habitual] acts” (Butler 1999, 179): through wearing certain gender-coded clothing, walking and sitting in certain gender-coded ways, styling one's hair in gender-coded manner and so on. Gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a sequence of acts, a doing rather than a being. And repeatedly engaging in ‘feminising’ and ‘masculinising’ acts congeals gender thereby making people falsely think of gender as something they naturally are. Gender only comes into being through these gendering acts: a female who has sex with men does not express her gender as a woman. This activity (amongst others) makes her gendered a woman.

The constitutive acts that gender individuals create genders as “compelling illusion[s]” (Butler 1990, 271). Our gendered classification scheme is a strong pragmatic construction: social factors wholly determine our use of the scheme and the scheme fails to represent accurately any ‘facts of the matter’ (Haslanger 1995, 100). People think that there are true and real genders, and those deemed to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ are not socially sanctioned. But, genders are true and real only to the extent that they are performed (Butler 1990, 278–9). It does not make sense, then, to say of a male-to-female trans person that s/he is really a man who only appears to be a woman. Instead, males dressing up and acting in ways that are associated with femininity “show that [as Butler suggests] ‘being’ feminine is just a matter of doing certain activities” (Stone 2007, 64). As a result, the trans person's gender is just as real or true as anyone else's who is a ‘traditionally’ feminine female or masculine male (Butler 1990, 278).[5] Without heterosexism that compels people to engage in certain gendering acts, there would not be any genders at all. And ultimately the aim should be to abolish norms that compel people to act in these gendering ways.

For Butler, given that gender is performative, the appropriate response to feminist identity politics involves two things. First, feminists should understand ‘woman’ as open-ended and “a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end … it is open to intervention and resignification” (Butler 1999, 43). That is, feminists should not try to define ‘woman’ at all. Second, the category of women “ought not to be the foundation of feminist politics” (Butler 1999, 9). Rather, feminists should focus on providing an account of how power functions and shapes our understandings of womanhood not only in the society at large but also within the feminist movement.

#### (Don’t read against Normativity Arg)

#### While sex relates to biological difference, gender is a social construct concerning the cultural expectations attributed to women and men

Khattak 2011

Shamaas Gul Khattak (School of Arts and Education, Middlesex University). “Feminism in Education: Historical and Contemporary Issues of Gender Inequality in Higher Education.” November 2011. <http://www.mdx.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/50050/Shamaass_Gul_Khattak.pdf> //PZ

The word gender comes from the English gendre, a loanword from old French. This, in turn, came from Latin: ‘genus’. Both words mean ‘kind’, ‘type’, or ‘sort’. It appears in modern French in the word ‘genre’ (type, kind, also ‘genre sexuel’) and is related to the Greek root ‘gen-’ (to produce), appearing in ‘gene’, ‘genesis’, and ‘oxygen’. As a verb, it means ‘to breed’. Most uses of the root ‘gen’ in Indo-European languages refer either directly to what pertains to birth or, by extension, to natural, innate qualities and their consequent social distinctions (such as gentry, generation, gentile, genocide and eugenics) (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2008). The general consensus is that word ‘sex’ relates to biological difference. It has also been used in the context of social roles of men and women—for example, the British Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 which ended exclusion of women from various official positions. This usage was more common in the 1960s and earlier. During the 1970s, the radical feminist movement had begun to take the word gender into their own usage to describe their theory of human nature. However, by the end of the decade consensus was achieved among radical feminists regarding a theory that human nature is essentially epicene and social distinctions based on sex are arbitrarily constructed (Thomas, 1999). Matters pertaining to this theoretical process of social construction were labelled matters of gender, while gender is a social construction; it concerns the differing qualities culturally attributed to women and men.

### Pain representation

#### Queer women of color do not yet reached a written conclusion that is pain-free. Their demand to exclude pain only silences voices

Middleton ’12, Master of Arts in the Department of Ethnic Studies at Colorado State University, (Kianna, “’I feel, therefore I can be free’: Black women and Chicana Queer narratives and differential consciousness and foundational theory,”) https://dspace.library.colostate.edu/bitstream/handle/10217/67316/Middleton\_colostate\_0053N\_11071.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Carla Trujillo, in the introduction to Chicana Lesbians: The Girls Our Mothers Warned Us About (1991), writes that “our own existence imposes a reclamation of what we’re told is bad, wrong, or taboo, namely our own sexuality” (pp. x). Chicana voices have overwhelmingly been silenced in literature and likewise, writing that showcases Chicana women’s sexuality, heterosexual or non, has also been absent. Trujillo promises that the book “expresses the vitality of our existence, our strength, and the perseverance of our struggles. It examines issues that are “difficult to talk about,” yet need to be discussed so that we may delve further into the process of our own self-definition and discovery” (pp. xii). Coming into identity is never easy, it is never neat, nor is it overwhelmingly pleasant. True to her word, Chicana Lesbians is a seminal literary work because of its ‘realness’. Queer women of color have not had enough time, literarily, to explore ‘difficult to talk about’ subjects, nor show pain and healing in any true manner. This is a result of invisibility and annihilation. Therefore, what is written now, in some respects, still has to be painful, has to be raw, and does not necessarily have to have pain-free conclusions as many queer women of color have not reached nor written there yet.

# \*AFF\*

## State Good and Perm

#### The state is inevitable—Liberal state reform is possible and an effective arena for challenging patriarchy

Connell ’90, former University Chair in the University of Sydney, (Raewyn, “The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal,” *Theory and Society*, Vol. 19, No. 5 (Oct., 1990), pp. 507-544) //PZ

Is the state patriarchal? Yes, beyond any argument, on the evidence dis- cussed above. It is not "essentially patriarchal" or "male"; even if one could speak of the "essence" of a social institution, this would exagger- ate the internal coherence of the state. Rather the state is historically patriarchal, patriarchal as a matter of concrete social practices. State structures in recent history institutionalize the European equation between authority and a dominating masculinity; they are effectively con- trolled by men; and they operate with a massive bias towards hetero- sexual men's interests. At the same time the pattern of state patriarchy changes. In terms of the depth of oppression and the historical possibilities of resistance and transformation, a fascist regime is crucially different from a liberal one, and a liberal one from a revolutionary one. The most favorable historical circumstance for progressive sexual politics seems to be the early days of social-revolutionary regimes; but the later bureaucratization of these regimes is devastating. Next best is a liberal state with a reformist government; though reforms introduced under its aegis are vulnerable in periods of reaction. Though the state is patriarchal, progressive gender politics cannot avoid it. The character of the state as the central institutionalization of power, and its historical trajectory in the regulation and constitution of gender relations, make it unavoidably a major arena for challenges to patriarchy. Here liberal feminism is on strong ground. Becoming engaged in practical struggles for a share of state power requires tactical judgments about what developments within the state provide opportunities. In the 1980s certain strategies of reform have had a higher relative pay-off than they did before. In Australia, for instance, the creation of a network of "women's services" was a feature of the 1970s, and the momentum of this kind of action has died away. Reforms that have few budgetary implications but fit in with other state strategies, such as modernizing the bureaucracy, become more prominent. Equal employment opportunity and anti-discrimination legislation have been highlighted; decriminalizing homosexuality is consistent with this.

#### Perm solves— empirics prove that education and legal reform can effectively break down patriarchy absent an overhaul of the system

Khattak 2011

Shamaas Gul Khattak (School of Arts and Education, Middlesex University). “Feminism in Education: Historical and Contemporary Issues of Gender Inequality in Higher Education.” November 2011. [http://www.mdx.ac.uk/\_\_data/assets/pdf\_file/0010/50050/Shamaass\_Gul\_Khattak.pdf //](http://www.mdx.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/50050/Shamaass_Gul_Khattak.pdf%20//) PZ

Liberal feminism is characterized by an individualistic emphasis on equality. According to this philosophy, society itself does not need a major overhaul, but rather, laws need to be changed and opportunities have to be opened up to allow women to become equals in society. To a liberal feminist, evidence of progress is seen largely by the numbers of women in positions previously occupied by men. The view of education which dominated feminist thought in the 1970s was heavily influenced by liberal explanations of working-class failure in education. Just as these explanations had concentrated on the inadequacy of working-class culture and had put forward the notion of compensatory education, so the tendency of feminists was to explain girls’ academic failure in terms of deficiencies of their socialization. Schemes such as Girls into Science and Technology (GIST) and FEMINISM IN EDUCATION 73 Women into Science and Engineering (WISE) were devised as ‘remedies’ to girls’ early socialization. In the liberal model, education tends to be seen, to some extent, in isolation from the social structure. Education may create and perpetuate inequality, it also has the power to redress it. For example, Friedan (1983, p. 67) believed that it was ‘The Feminine Mystique’ which prevented women from leading successful public lives. The education system was partly to blame for the ideology of the feminine mystique, but equally the solution for women who were trapped in their roles as wives and mothers was to return to college to obtain an education. In a sense, then, women’s main problem was their own attitude (even though it might be an attitude fostered both by the education system and the media). According to Thomas (1999), if only women would stop wanting to become housewives and start wanting to become lawyers or doctors instead, the problem would end. Most liberal feminists believe that schools are partly responsible for instilling sexist attitudes in children (Delamont, 1990, p.3). Delamont further argued that: ‘Schools develop and reinforce sex segregation, stereotype and even discriminations which segregate the negative aspects of sex roles in the outside world, when they could be trying to alleviate them.’ These statements demonstrate a central argument of the liberal feminists’ analysis—i.e. the ability of school to promote good or bad attitudes, with the implication tha t changing schools will change attitudes and, [ultimately] society.

## Alt Fails

#### Feminist pedagogy fials—it exacerbates power relations in the classroom by privileging certain voices over others

McClure ’00, Discovery Fellow, Professor, Classics, Living Environments Laboratory, (Laura, “Feminist Pedagogy and the Classics,” *The Classical World*, Vol. 94, No. 1 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 53-55) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4352498.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A9d4a9fa4630aa61b4d95e05cbd732858> // PZ

What underlies almost all of these feminist pedagogies is a preference for a student-centered and more democratic classroom in which students and teachers "act as subjects, not objects."'5 A feminist pedagogy encourages stu- dents to use their own experiences as a basis for learning, demystifies ca- nonical knowledge, and exposes the role of gender, race, and class in con- figuring power relations. It creates a "community of learners" who respect multiple subjectivities and participate in a shared dialectic of autonomy and mutuality. It avoids "conceptual imperialism" and "top-down" methods like formal lecturing.6 While on the surface affirming feminist values and redressing an imbal- ance within the academy, feminist pedagogy also contains many contradictions, two of which I would like to raise in relation to the following papers. First, feminist pedagogy may actually mask rather than expose power relations; after all, we, the teachers, set the agenda and assign grades, not the students. What kind of message are we sending when we affirm and nurture students in class and yet send them home with a "C" or a "D"? Ellsworth powerfully illustrates this point in her essay, "Why Doesn't This Feel Empowering?" in which she argues that liberatory pedagogy may actually reinscribe some of the categories it seeks to unsettle by, for instance, privileging speech over silence.7 The second danger I foresee is that feminist pedagogy may actually entrap women faculty and students in stereotypical roles: in our efforts to create an open, more democratic classroom, we may actually reinforce students' perceptions of women as less competent and less rigorous, a view in fact repeatedly expressed by students in the evaluation study mentioned earlier. I believe that we do our students and our- selves a disfavor by lowering standards and creating a classroom where anything goes. In fact, true empowerment comes from finding that one can successfully meet the challenges presented in the classroom. As Adrienne Rich remarks:

#### Feminist pedagogy can never completely uproot systems of oppression that make women and students of color can still feel unsafe asserting their subjectivity in the classroom

hooks ’65, social activist, feminist theorist, educator, writer (youre a square if you don’t know who bell hooks is), (bell, “Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom ,” Chapter 39-40, pp. https://academictrap.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/bell-hooks-teaching-to-transgress.pdf // PZ

Making the classroom a democratic setting where everyone feels a responsibility to contribute is a central goal of transformative pedagogy. Throughout my teaching career, white professors have often voiced concern to me about nonwhite students who do not talk. As the classroom becomes more diverse, teachers are faced with the way the politics of domination are often reproduced in the educational setting. For example, white male students continue to be the most vocal in our classes. Students of color and some white women express fear that they will be judged as intellectually inadequate by these peers. I have taught brilliant students of color, many of them seniors, who have skillfully managed never to speak in classroom settings. Some express the feeling that they are less likely to suffer any kind of assault if they simply do not assert their subjectivity. They have told me that many professors never showed any interest in hearing their voices. Accepting the decentering of the West globally, embracing multiculturalism, compels educators to focus attention on the issue of voice. Who speaks? Who listens? And why? Caring about whether all students fulfill their responsibility to contribute to learning in the classroom is not a common approach in what Freire has called the "banking system of education" where students are regarded merely as passive consumers. Since so many professors teach from that standpoint, it is difficult to create the kind of learning community that can fully embrace multiculturalism. Students are much more willing to surrender their dependency on the banking system of education than are their teachers. They are also much more willing to face the challenge of multiculturalism.

## Normativity DA

#### The negative team’s focus on “women” as the benefactors of a feminist pedagogy implies that there is correct way to be a gendered women, and that feminism is only for only for those people. They draw categorical distinctions and reinforce systems of power

Mikkola ’17, Junior Professor in Practical Philosophy at the Humboldt-University, Berlin, (Mari, “Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, summer 2017 edition) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/feminism-gender/> // PZ

Judith Butler critiques the sex/gender distinction on two grounds. She critiques gender realism with her normativity argument (1999 [original 1990], chapter 1); she also holds that the sex/gender distinction is unintelligible (this will be discussed in section 3.3.). Butler's normativity argument is not straightforwardly directed at the metaphysical perspective of gender realism, but rather at its political counterpart: identity politics. This is a form of political mobilization based on membership in some group (e.g. racial, ethnic, cultural, gender) and group membership is thought to be delimited by some common experiences, conditions or features that define the group (Heyes 2000, 58; see also the entry on Identity Politics). Feminist identity politics, then, presupposes gender realism in that feminist politics is said to be mobilized around women as a group (or category) where membership in this group is fixed by some condition, experience or feature that women supposedly share and that defines their gender.

Butler's normativity argument makes two claims. The first is akin to Spelman's particularity argument: unitary gender notions fail to take differences amongst women into account thus failing to recognise “the multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of ‘women’ are constructed” (Butler 1999, 19–20). In their attempt to undercut biologically deterministic ways of defining what it means to be a woman, feminists inadvertedly created new socially constructed accounts of supposedly shared femininity. Butler's second claim is that such false gender realist accounts are normative. That is, in their attempt to fix feminism's subject matter, feminists unwittingly defined the term ‘woman’ in a way that implies there is some correct way to be gendered a woman (Butler 1999, 5). That the definition of the term ‘woman’ is fixed supposedly “operates as a policing force which generates and legitimizes certain practices, experiences, etc., and curtails and delegitimizes others” (Nicholson 1998, 293). Following this line of thought, one could say that, for instance, Chodorow's view of gender suggests that ‘real’ women have feminine personalities and that these are the women feminism should be concerned about. If one does not exhibit a distinctly feminine personality, the implication is that one is not ‘really’ a member of women's category nor does one properly qualify for feminist political representation.

Butler's second claim is based on her view that“[i]dentity categories [like that of women] are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary” (Butler 1991, 160). That is, the mistake of those feminists Butler critiques was not that they provided the incorrect definition of ‘woman’. Rather, (the argument goes) their mistake was to attempt to define the term ‘woman’ at all. Butler's view is that ‘woman’ can never be defined in a way that does not prescribe some “unspoken normative requirements” (like having a feminine personality) that women should conform to (Butler 1999, 9). Butler takes this to be a feature of terms like ‘woman’ that purport to pick out (what she calls) ‘identity categories’. She seems to assume that ‘woman’ can never be used in a non-ideological way (Moi 1999, 43) and that it will always encode conditions that are not satisfied by everyone we think of as women. Some explanation for this comes from Butler's view that all processes of drawing categorical distinctions involve evaluative and normative commitments; these in turn involve the exercise of power and reflect the conditions of those who are socially powerful (Witt 1995).

In order to better understand Butler's critique, consider her account of gender performativity. For her, standard feminist accounts take gendered individuals to have some essential properties qua gendered individuals or a gender core by virtue of which one is either a man or a woman. This view assumes that women and men, qua women and men, are bearers of various essential and accidental attributes where the former secure gendered persons' persistence through time as so gendered. But according to Butler this view is false: (i) there are no such essential properties, and (ii) gender is an illusion maintained by prevalent power structures. First, feminists are said to think that genders are socially constructed in that they have the following essential attributes (Butler 1999, 24): women are females with feminine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at men; men are males with masculine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at women. These are the attributes necessary for gendered individuals and those that enable women and men to persist through time as women and men. Individuals have “intelligible genders” (Butler 1999, 23) if they exhibit this sequence of traits in a coherent manner (where sexual desire follows from sexual orientation that in turn follows from feminine/ masculine behaviours thought to follow from biological sex). Social forces in general deem individuals who exhibit incoherent gender sequences (like lesbians) to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ and they actively discourage such sequencing of traits, for instance, via name-calling and overt homophobic discrimination. Think back to what was said above: having a certain conception of what women are like that mirrors the conditions of socially powerful (white, middle-class, heterosexual, Western) women functions to marginalize and police those who do not fit this conception.

These gender cores, supposedly encoding the above traits, however, are nothing more than illusions created by ideals and practices that seek to render gender uniform through heterosexism, the view that heterosexuality is natural and homosexuality is deviant (Butler 1999, 42). Gender cores are constructed as if they somehow naturally belong to women and men thereby creating gender dimorphism or the belief that one must be either a masculine male or a feminine female. But gender dimorphism only serves a heterosexist social order by implying that since women and men are sharply opposed, it is natural to sexually desire the opposite sex or gender.

## Whiteness DA

#### The starting point of your politics is too white, dooming it to fail – we need to start from a position of intersectionality in order to achieve effective coalitions to combat violence

Mann and Huffman 5 Susan Archer Mann is a Professor and Associate Chair of the Department of Sociology at the University of New Orleans. [Mann, Susan Archer, and Douglas J. Huffman. “The Decentering of Second Wave Feminism and the Rise of the Third Wave.” Science & Society, vol. 69, no. 1, 2005, pp. 56–91. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40404229.]

THE EARLY THIRD WAVE: INTERSECTIONALITY AND POSTMODERNISM/POST-STRUCTURALISM Contributions by Women of Colar and Ethnicity While women of color and ethnicity had been notable activists and writers throughout both the first and second waves, they were truly the pioneers of the third wave in that they were the first to pro- vide an extensive critique of second wave feminism from within the feminist movement. They were also the first to use the term "third wave" (Springer, 2002, 1063). The crux of this new direction in feminism was a critique of the "essentialist woman" of the second wave, which they claimed ignored or downplayed differences among women (Spelman, 1988). Audre Lorde captures the essence of this critique in the following quote: By and large within the women's movement today, white women focus upon their oppression as women and ignore differences of race, sexual prefer- ence, class, and age. There is a pretense to a homogeneity of experience covered by the word sisterhood that does not in fact exist. (2000, 289.) Hence, while the essentialist "we" or "sisterhood" of the second wave was ostensibly meant to unify the women's movement, instead it proved to be a painful source of factionalization - what Elizabeth Spelman called the "Trojan horse of feminist ethnocentrism" (1988, x). A related critique by feminists of color and ethnicity centered on the issue of how the second wave dealt with "multiple and simultaneous oppressions" (Smith, 1983, xxxii). Here two tendencies within the sec- ond wave were most frequently attacked. The first treated multiple oppressions as separate and distinct or what these critics called a pop bead or additive approach to multiple oppressions (Spelman, 1988; King, 1988) . The second hierarchized oppressions or treated one form as more fundamental than another. Neither of these approaches ade- quately conceptualized multiple oppressions as simultaneous, insepa- rable, and interlocking. One of the earliest pieces to articulate the simultaneous and non- hierarchical nature of oppressions was the Combahee River Collective's "Black Feminist Statement," published in 1978. This was followed in the 1980s by such classics as All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, but Some of Us Are Brave (Hull, Bell-Scott and Smith, 1982); This Bridge Called My Back: Radical Writings by Women of Color (Moraga and Anzaldua, 1983); Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology (Smith, 1983); and Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (hooks, 1984) . Viewing them- selves as "outsiders" within the feminist movement, these pioneers of the third wave created a feminism of their own (Lorde, 2000) . Importantly, their new feminism highlighted the need for femi- nists not only to address external forms of oppression, but also to examine forms of oppression and discrimination that they themselves had internalized. This required all feminists to pay more serious at- tention to the difficult process of building a movement connected by difference, and to critically examine how the politics of the past suffered from "the loss of each other" (Breines, 2002, 1127). Deeply troubled by the failure to build a unified feminist move- ment, a number of white, second wave feminists delved deeper into our past history, seeking reasons for this failure. They knew that the second wave had not ignored differences among women, even though this view was widespread. Indeed, many second wave feminists were acutely aware of issues of race, class and imperialism, having cut their political teeth through their involvement in the Civil Rights Move- ment, the New Left, and the anti-Vietnam War movement before joining the feminist movement. Lise Vogel, for example, challenged the consensus that had developed by the 1990s that race and class were not of interest to feminists until the 1980s. She admonished those who had simplified the complicated history of the second wave and seriously questioned how participants in the second wave could have forgotten the saliency of issues like race and class, which were an integral part of the feminism of the 1960s and 1970s (Vogel, 1991). Another second wave activist, Wini Breines, recently provided an interesting answer to this question. Based on documents by and in- terviews with socialist feminists who were active during the 1960s and 1970s, she argues that "an abstract anti-racism characterized much of the theorizing and politics of white feminism" (2002, 1122). That is, while many white, second wave feminists wrote about and analyzed differences by race and class, they seldom interacted socially with Black women. Their abstract theoretical and analytical comprehen- sion of racism proved insufficient. Breines writes: "Without knowing one another, they could not make a movement together" (2002, 1 123) . She concludes that feminists need both a political understand- ing of racism and a personal-political understanding of how racism affects our everyday lives. This link between personal interaction and political action suggests that the second wave's notion that the per- sonal is political has even more implications for feminist practice than was initially understood. Yet, the politics derived from this new feminist discourse by women of color and ethnicity made the process of building connections based on difference difficult. This politics is often referred to as identity politics because it rooted politics in group identities or social loca- tions. As Linda Alcoff puts it: "The idea here is that one's identity is taken (and defined) as a political point of departure, as a motivation for action, and as a delineation of one's politics" (1988, 412). Given the multiplicity and diversity of oppressed groups, coalition building is the major means for fostering effective political action (Combahee River Collective, 1978). However, since identities placed exclusive boundaries on group membership, these politics also embodied the negative potential to revert to fragmentation or "tribalism" (Touraine, 1998, 131). Identity politics not only affected political practice; it also affected the way feminist theoretical perspectives came to be defined or dis- tinguished. In the 1980s, it was common to see the perspective delin- eated above called by various names such as Africana feminism, Black feminist thought, or the women of color and ethnicity perspective. This shift from feminist perspectives distinguished by their politics (such as Marxist feminism or liberal feminism) to designations based on identity was, itself, essentialist and misleading, since it lumped together women of color or ethnicity, ignoring their own diversity of political persuasions. Yet most feminists ignored this change, as men- tion of it was rare (Jaggar and Rothenberg, 1993, xxii-xiv). During the 1990s, this theory of simultaneous and multiple op- pressions was rearticulated, largely as a result of the theoretical writ- ings of Patricia Hill Collins. Collins moved from first calling this perspective Black feminist thought (1990) to renaming it inter- sectionality theory (Andersen and Collins, 1994; Collins, 1998) - a designation that enabled its theoretical and political assumptions to prevail over standpoint or identity. Collins also created a new femi- nist epistemology that has had a profound effect on feminist thought. Here she developed a social constructionist view of knowledge that linked identities, standpoints and social locations in a matrix of domi- nation. She writes: The overarching matrix of domination houses multiple groups, each with varying experiences with penalty and privilege that produce corresponding partial perspectives [and] situated knowledges. . . . No one group has a clear angle of vision. No one group possesses the theory or methodology that allows it to discover the absolute "truth" or, worse yet, proclaim its theories and methodologies as the universal norm evaluating other groups' experi- ences. (1990, 234-235.) This new epistemology shared with postmodernism/poststruc- turalism certain key assumptions that had significant implications for the third wave's analyses of power and knowledge. However, as the quote above suggests, the politics embraced by intersectionality theory focused on groups exploiting other groups and maintained an analy- sis of oppression that was relational, oppositional and structural, despite its multiplicity. In contrast, the critique of second wave femi- nism leveled by postmodernists and poststructuralists used difference to deconstruct all group categories and to reject oppositional think- ing, as we discuss below

## Girls outperform boys

#### The affirmative is key—current trends show that boys are underperforming, while girls now dominate the academic field in all subjects

Kohn ’02, correspondent at CBSNews, (David, “The Gender Gap: Boys Lagging, Girls Move Ahead,” *CBS News*) <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-gender-gap-boys-lagging/> // PZ

Remember when girls became nurses and not doctors? Stenographers, not CEOs? Teachers, not principals? Well, that's not the way it is any more. Thirty years after the passage of equal opportunity laws, girls are graduating from high school and college and going into professions and businesses in record numbers. Now, it's the boys who could use a little help in school, where they're falling behind their female counterparts. And if you think it's just boys from the inner cities, think again. It's happening in all segments of society, in all 50 states. That's why more and more educators are calling for a new national effort to put boys on an equal footing with their sisters. Lesley Stahl reports. At graduation ceremonies last June at Hanover High School in Massachusetts, it was the ninth year in a row that a girl was on the podium as school valedictorian. Girls also took home nearly all the honors, including the science prize, says principal Peter Badalament. “[Girls] tend to dominate the landscape academically right now,” he says, even in math and science. The school's advanced placement classes, which admit only the most qualified students, are often 70 percent to 80 percent girls. This includes calculus. And in AP biology, there was not a single boy. According to Badalment, three out of four of the class leadership positions, including the class presidents, are girls. In the National Honor Society, almost all of the officers are girls. The yearbook editor is a girl. While there are statistically more boy geniuses than girl geniuses, far more boys than girls are found at the very bottom of the academic ranks. School districts from Massachusetts to Minnesota to California report that boys are withdrawing from the life of schools, and girls are taking over. “Girls outperform boys in elementary school, middle school, high school, and college, and graduate school,” says Dr. Michael Thompson, a school psychologist who writes about the academic problems of boys in his book, "Raising Cain." He says that after decades of special attention, girls are soaring, while boys are stagnating. “Girls are being told, 'Go for it, you can do it. Go for it, you can do it.' They are getting an immense amount of support,” he says. “Boys hear that the way to shine is athletically. And boys get a lot of mixed messages about what it means to be masculine and what it means to be a student. Does being a good student make you a real man? I don't think so… It is not cool.” “Girls don't necessarily get teased as much if they do well,” says Meredith, a graduating senior at Hanover High. “I think that boys are more, you know, expected to be the star athletes, to bring home the football title,” says Tom, another graduating senior. Their classmate Colby agrees: “I think maybe girls are a little more goal-oriented, where guys, in general, are more apt to go with the flow, like, 'Well, if I do well in high school, that's great. If I don't, hey, that's fine.'” The picture doesn't get much brighter for young men when they get to college. Campuses are now nearly 60 percent female, with women earning 170,000 more bachelor degrees each year than men. Women are streaming into business schoosdr6ls and medical schools, and will be the majority at the nation's law schools. At some colleges, they're getting so many more qualified women applicants than men applicants that the schools are doing something that might shock you. “To make a class that's 50/50, they're practicing affirmative action on behalf of boys,” says Thompson. “Girls are so outperforming boys in school right now, one statistician said he took it out to its absurd endpoint and said at the present trend, the last man to get his bachelor's degree will do so in 2068.” Even if that never happens, the trend is ominous. Boys are falling further behind girls in reading and writing, and still, there's no public outcry the way there was for girls, and we wanted to find out why.